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Abstract 
Psychologists currently know very little about the nature and 
course o~ speci~ic emotions in close relationship settings. Thus~ 
the major purpose o~ this research programme was to explore emotion 
knowledge structures in marriage by making a detailed prototypical 
and cognitive appraisal analysis o~ +our emotions: love~ hate~ anger 
and jealousy. 
In Study 1, 160 subjects recalled a speci~ic incident o~ love~ 
hate, anger or jealousy (40 subjects per emotion)~ and wrote 
detailed accounts o~ their memories o~ the event (including their 
physiological symptoms~ urges~ behaviours and cognitive appraisals). 
Four distinct prototypes and cognitive appraisal patterns were 
obtained ~or the ~our emotions. 
The purpose o~ Study 2 was to compare hypothetical emotion 
accounts with the recalled accounts ~rom Study 1. Eighty subjects 
gave their opinions about typical love, hate, anger and jealousy 
eliciting events in marriage, and described probable urges, symptoms 
and behaviours. The results were in general accord with Study 1, 
suggesting that both recalled and hypothetical emotion accounts are 
derived ~rom the same prototypical knowledge structures. However, 
there were discrepancies in hate-related urges and behaviours 
between the recall and 'hypothetical accounts. Speci~ically, recall 
accounts cited withdrawal urges and behaviours, whereas hypothetical 
accounts cited physically violent urges and behaviours. 
In Study 3, the in~luence 0+ causal locus on emotions and 
cognitive appraisal patterns was investigated. Subjects imagined 
experiencing either sel+, partner or externally-caused love, hate, 
anger or jealousy ~or their partners, and rated their cognitive 
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appraisals along the same dimensions as used in Study 1. Although 
the appraisal pattern ~or externally-caused hate di~~ered +rom sel+ 
or partner-caused hate~ no di~~erences were obtained ~or the other 
three emotions~ according to causal locus. With the causal 
conditions combined, the cognitive appraisal results were in general 
accord with those obtained in Study 1 ~or all ~our emotions. 
Study 4 was concerned with ~urther testing the validity 0+ the 
results ~rom Study 1. Subjects selected the most appropriate emotion 
~rom a list o~ 8 emotions, based on varying amounts 0+ in~ormation 
(event description only, event plus prototype, event plus 
appraisals, or event plus all in~ormation) derived ~rom Study 1. 
Supporting the results o~ Study 1, adding prototypical and/or 
appraisal in~ormation signi~icantly increased the accuracy o~ 
emotion identi+ication over the event description condition, with 
jealousy being the most accurately identi~ied, and hate the least. A 
partial replication in which the prototypical ~eatures ~or hate ~rom 
Study 1 (withdrawal) were replaced by the +eatures +rom Study 2 
(verbal and physical abuse) decreased hate identi+ication accuracy 
even ~urther, suggesting that the recall accounts comprised 
reasonably accurate depictions o~ hate in marriage. 
The overall results are discussed, ~irst, in relation to the 
role o~ context in emotion prototype analysis. The advantages 0+ 
taking a combined cognitive appraisal and prototype approach to the 
study 0+ emotions are noted, and the implications o~ such analyses 
~or close relationship research are outlined. Directions +or +urther 
research are identi~ied, including laboratory-based interactive 
studies, and ecologically valid investigations o~ emotions in 
marital settings. The discussion concludes with a brie+ commentary 
on the theoretical debate about basic emotions. 
1. 1. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The notion that intimate sexual relationships are inextricably 
intertwined with streng feelings and emotions is a truism within 
romantic novels and common sense thinking alike. Psychologists, too, 
have o~ten remarked on the importance o~ emotions in close 
relationships. Many o~ our most intense emotions are associated with 
the initiation, maintenance and disruption o~ a~~ectional bonds 
(Bowlby, 1973), while Shaver (1984) has characterised close 
re lat ionships as the vet-y "c .... uc i bl e in which emot ions at-e fat-med" 
(p. 7). However, in spite o~ the renai~sance in the study of both 
emotions and close relationships over the last two decades, .... esea .... ch 
and theo .... y building have la .... gely p .... oceeded in a parallel, rather than 
interactive, ~ashion within the two areas. Consequently, the amount 
o~ resea .... ch into affective phenomena that has been specifically 
conducted ~ithin an interpersonal context is both minimal and 
fragmentary (Fitness & Strongman, in press). 
Despite the lack of integrative theo .... izing and resea .... ch, it 
has become increasingly apparent ove .... the last ten years that a 
significant point o~ convergence between emotion and close 
relationships is in sight. This point, which may be loosely defined 
in terms o~ "cognition", subsumes a wide range of conscious and 
unconscious phenomena, such as perception, memory, language, 
appraisal, evaluation, belie~s, attitudes, expectations and problem 
solving. Within the field of emotion, the most recent empirical and 
theoretical work has underscored the extreme dif~iculty of 
accounting for emotion without considering the central role of 
cognition (Strongman, 1987). Similarly, within the ~ield o~ close 
relationships, the importance o~ understanding cognitive processes 
and their role in relationship phenomena is re~lected in the 
burgeoning research and theorizing in this area (Fletcher & Fincham, 
in press). 
Consequently, the ~ocus o~ this general introduction is on 
cognition and its role in emotion within the context o~ close 
relationships. The ~irst goal is to brie~ly describe and discuss 
what has been learned ~rom behavioural approaches to the study o~ 
a~~ect in marital interaction (e. g. Gottman, 1979). The second goal 
is to outline Berscheid's (1983) theoretical analysis o~ emotion in 
close relationships, and to relate her theory to current 
understandings about cognition and e~otion. The ~inal goal is to 
d~scribe how emotion prototype and cognitive appraisal analyses can 
elucidate our understanding o~ emotions within the context o~ 
marital relationships, and to provide a general overview o~ the 
current research programme. 
Behavioural Accounts o~ Emotion 
in Close Relationships 
Possibly the major reason ~or the lack of integrative research 
into emotion in close relationships, to date, derives ~rom the 
problematic nature o~ emotion itsel~ as an easily de~inable, 
obset-vCl.ble, measureable entity. The term "emotion" is a theoretical 
construct, typically used as a catch-all generic to include all 
manner o~ phenomena that could loosely be described as emotional. 
Consequently, until recently, psychologists working within the area 
o~ close relationships have o~ten opted to study more readily 
operationalized variables, such as observable behaviour, than to 
tackle the seemingly nebulous, subjective world o~ emotions. 
However, some behaviourally oriented theorists and researchers 
have attempted to come td grips with emotion in close relationships 
by operationalising amotion in terms of behavioural, or expressive, 
displays (e. g. Gottman, 1979). Typically, such researchers have 
investigated so-called emotional behaviour in the context o~ 
laboratory-based, marital interactions. For example, Gottman (1979) 
videotaped married couples' interactions in the laboratory, and had 
observers code the a~~ective (otherwise defined as nonverbal) 
component of each message as positive, negative, or neutral. Results 
consistently indicated that distressed couples evince higher rates 
of negative affect than nondistressed couples, and that distressed 
couples are more likely to reciprocat~ each other~s negative a~fect 
th~n nondistressed couples.' Although it is arguable whether or not 
nonverbal behaviour constitutes a faith~ul reflection of inner 
emotional states~ Gottman's findings have been confirmed by several 
researchers (e. g. Schaap, 1982; Margolin and Wampold, 1981; 
Revenstorf, 1984). Indeed, Notarius & Herrick (1989) have claimed 
that negative affect reciprocity is the most critical featUre of 
distressed marital interaction. 
Measuring and classifying nonverbal, or affective behaviours in 
a global ~ashion as either positive or negative is a parsimonious 
procedure, and has some theot-et ical val i di ty in that the 
positive/negative dimension represents a generally recognized, 
meaning~ul distinction between emotion categories (Russell, 1978; 
Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & O'Connor, 1987). However, it is obvious, 
to the layperson and marital researcher alike, that people in close 
relationships actually experience (even i~ they do not express) an 
enormous number of emotions. Although each of these can be subsumed 
within an overall pleasureable/displeasureable category, the 
amount of useful information that can be gleaned from this approach 
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is limited. For example, when researchers speak of negative a~fect 
reciprocity between distressed marital partners, it is never clear 
from the global affect codes whether or not the same a~fect is being 
reciprocated - does anger evoke anger, or contempt, or sadness? 
In recognition of this problem, Gottman and his colleagues 
have recently developed a coding scheme to separate some of the 
components of negative affect into sadness, anger, disgust or 
contempt, fear and whining, and positive affect into affection, 
humour, interest, anticipation, excitement or joy (SPAFF: Specific 
Affect Coding Coding System; Gottman & Levenson, 1986). Various 
studies using this system have demonstrated the utility of refining 
global affect codes into more discriminable components. In one 
conflict discussion, for example, Gottman and Levenson (1986) found 
that 77.71. of the husband's negative affect consisted of anger or 
contempt, while those emotions accounted for only 6.71. of the wife's 
negative affect. However, 93.2% of tler negative affect consisted of 
whining, sadness and fear. 
Gottman's attempts to go beyond global affect measures and 
differentiate the kinds of emotions partners express are laudable, 
but the SPAFF coding scheme does present some problems. For example, 
some of the emotion categories would appear to be barely 
discriminable on the basis of observable behaviour (e. g. humour 
and joy; anticipation and interest), and one might question 
the status of whining as an emotion. Overall, the emotion coding 
categories can only be described as arbitrary, in that Gottman 
developed the scheme according to a rough, ~ priori theory about the 
most commonly experienced (or at least expressed) emotions in 
interactive contexts. Accordingly, using SPAFF, coders are unable to 
classify surprise, relief, embarrassment, guilt or frustration, or 
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discriminate between ~ear, worry and anxiety emotions which may be 
highly relevant in interpersonal interactions. For example, a recent 
study on dating partners' most typical emotional reactions to sel~ 
and partner-initiated relationship behaviours (Fitness & Fletcher, 
1990) ~ound that disgust and contempt (SPAFF categories) were very 
infrequently reported, whereas frustration, embarrassment and worry 
(not included in SPAFF) were relatively ~requently reported. 
Subjects also discriminated between sadness and feeling hurt in 
their sel~ reports. Thus, while SPAFF represents a move in the right 
direction away from gross measures of positive or negative a~~ect 
states, more research is clearly called ~or in developing an emotion 
classificat.ory adequate ~or capturing the ~ull range o~ 
interpersonal af~ective behaviours. 
One such emotion coding scheme was developed in the context of 
the Fitness and Fletcher (1990) dating study, in which subjects gave 
their emotional responses to hypothetical, positive and negative 
relationship behaviours. Using this coding scheme, researchers were 
also able to reliably classify sel~-reported emotions in response to 
problem-solving discussions between married couples in the 
laboratory (Fletcher ~ Fitness, 1990). However, there are ecological 
validity problems with both hypothetical behaviour studies and 
behaviow-al investigations o-F a~fective behaviolW in labot-atory--
based, marital interactions. In particular, it is an arguable point 
to what extent the results of such studies generalize to the 
everyday emotional life o~ married couples. Researchers have begun 
to explore day-to-day marital interaction in the home by means of 
diary keeping and time sampling (e. g. Kirchler, 1988). However, to 
date there have been no detailed investigations of specifically 
emotional incidents in couples' lives. 
Berscheid"s Theoretical Account o~ Emotion 
in Close Relationships 
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In response to the lack o~ any theoretical overview o~ emotion 
in close relationships~ Berscheid (1983) published an elegant and 
articulate theory that attempted to account ~or the occurrence o~ 
positive and negative emotion in close relationships. Her analysis 
was structured within the ~ramework o~ a broad-based, evolutionary 
theory o~ emotion developed by Mandler (1975), who proposed that 
autonomic nervous system arousal is a necessary condition ~or 
emotion (though not su~~icient), and that such arousal is typically 
triggered by a change, or interruption, in an organism's ongoing 
activities. In e~~ect, arousal alerts the organism to a potentially 
dangerous state o~ a~~airs, and directs attention to the source o~ 
the arousal. Then, within the limits imposed by its cognitive-
interpretive system, the organism analyses the meaning and relevance 
o~ the stimulus to its ongoing wel~are, activities or plans. I~ the 
interrupting stimulus can be removed or dealt with quickly, or i~ a 
substitute response is available that permits the activity sequence 
or plan to be completed, then emotion may not be experienced. 
However, i+ the route to completion is perceived to be blocked, then 
negative emotion is typically elicited. 
Mandler pointed out that much o~ an organism's day-to-day 
activity is routinised and automatic, and runs in organized action 
sequences (e. g. getting up and dressed in the morning, preparing 
meals, etc.). In turn, many o~ these organized action sequences 
constitute hierarchical structures o~ higher order plans, or goals, 
such as saving to buy a house, or hoping ~or a success~ul marriage. 
All these organized action sequences and higher order plans are 
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subject to a great deal o~ interruption, ~rom the small - such as 
discovering as you are driving to work that your partner has 
neglected to put petrol in the car - to the large, such as learning 
that your partner no longer shares your dream o~ a success~ul 
marri~ge, and wants a divcr~e. According to M~ndlRr'5 theory, these 
interruptions, i+ accompanied by physiological arousal, should lead 
to the experience o~ "hot" negative emotion, the intensity o~ which 
depends on such +actors as the unpredictability, novelty, 
complexity, importance and negativity o~ the interruption. 
Berscheid took as her starting point Kelley et aI.'s (1983) 
de~inition o~ a close relationship as one in which a couple's 
interdependence patterns are characterized by high +requency and 
strength, covering a diverse range o~ activities, ~or a relatively 
long duration o~ time. Berscheid postulated that the greater the 
number o~ interconnections to each other's activities and plans a 
couple have, the greater the potential ~or interruption - that is, 
when one partner does something unexpected, or out o~ sequence, or 
+ails to do something expected. 1+ these interruptions are 
accompained by physiological arousal, then, in accord with Mandler'S 
theory, negative emotion should be elicited. 
Still working +rom within the interruption perspective, 
Berscheid also proposed an explanation +or the elicitation 0+ 
intense positive emotions in close relationships. Her hypothesis was 
that stimulus events that suddenly and unexpectedly remove obstacles 
or previously interruptive stimuli, or that complete an activity or 
plan sooner than expected, are likely to elicit strong, positive 
emotion. Consequently, within a close relationship, i+ each partner 
has the resources to remove obstacles +or the other, and/or 
unexpectedly complete each other's organized action sequences or 
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higher order plans, then they are likely to experience strong, 
positive emotion towards each other. Indeed, Berscheid (1983) 
described the conditions ~or the experience o~ intense romantic love 
as the "sudden unexpected realization that another is able and 
willing to help one ~ul~ill one's most cherished plans and hopes." 
(p. 155). 
Berscheid's analysis is ~inely argued and intuitively 
plausible, and some o~ her predictions have also been empirically 
supported. For example, Fitness & Fletcher (1990) ~ound that 
partner-initiated, relationship relevant behaviours, both positive 
and negative, elicited twice the number o~ sel~ reported emotions 
than did sel~-initiated, relationship relevant behaviours. Clearly, 
we are most likely to experience emotion in a close relationship 
when our partner does something to surprise or interrupt us (whether 
pleasantly or not). However, although Berscheid's analysis provides 
a good theoretical basis ~or work on emotions in close 
relationships, it has not, as yet, engendered much research. In 
part, this is because, like the behavioural approach, it deals with 
emotions in a relatively global ~ashion. For example, while it is 
use~ul to know that a partner-caused interruption to another's 
activities, hopes, or plans is likely to elicit arousal and emotion, 
a great deal more in~ormation is required be~ore it is possible to 
speci~y the kind o~ emotion (e. g. anger, or anxiety, or guilt) a 
person is likely to claim he or she is experiencing. Clearly, to 
predict a particular emotion ~or a participant in a relationship, we 
must identi~y not only their hopes and plans (and their potential 
~or interruption or ~acilitation), but also the speci~ic way in 
which they will interpret an event. 
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Cognitive Accounts o~ Emotion 
One clue to the missing link between interruption and emotion 
in Berscheid's analysis relates to the individual's attributions 
~bout the perceived cause o~ the interruptive behaviour, along with 
such ~actors as the stability and globality of the perceived cause 
(Weiner, 1985). However, although close relationship researchers 
have been investigating couples' explanations and attributions for 
each other's behaviours ~or some years now (e. g. Holtzworth-Munroe 
& Jacobson, 1985; Fletcher, Fincham, Cramer & Heron, 1987; Grigg, 
Fletcher & Fitness, 1989; Fletcher & ~incham, in press), empiricai 
investigations o~ the links between attributions and emotions within 
close relationships have only just begun. 
One such study was recently conducted by Bradbury (1989). Using 
Gottman & Levenson's (1986) SPAFF emotion coding scheme, Bradbury 
examined the links between couples~ attributions and emotional 
expression during laboratory-based marital interaction. As expected, 
different patterns o~ attributions relating to the causal locus~ 
stability and globality o~ spousal behaviours, were related to the 
expression o~ speci~ic emotions, such as anger, sadness and 
contempt. Clearly, despite the limitations o~ the SPAFF coding 
scheme, Bradbury's study makes an encouraging start in the 
exploration of attribution-emotion links within marital settings. 
However, although the attributional perspective to emotion 
provides a useful approach to the study of the links between 
cognition and emotion, it has a rather limited focus. Cognitive 
appraisal theorists like Lazarus (1966) and Smith and Ellsworth 
(1985, 1987) adopt a wider perspective to the cognitive antecedents 
o~ emotion. These theorists argue that an individual's emotion 
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depends on a number o~ cognitive interpretations o~ his or her 
partner's behaviour, including an assessment o~ the degree to which 
their plans, hopes and wishes have been interrupted, and whether or 
not there is an e~~ective means o~ dealing with the interruption. 
This approach implies taking into account not just the perceived 
causal locus o~ an interruptive behaviour, but also various 
cognitive appraisal dimensions such as the level o~ perceived 
obstacles in the situation, the degree o~ e~~ort required to deal 
with the situation, its predictability, and so on. 
A still wider, overarching perspective to the cognition-emotion 
~elationship is advanced by emotion prototype theorists (e. g. Fehr 
~(Russell, 1984; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirsan & O'Connor, 1987). These 
theorists view attributions and cognitions as being derived ~rom 
socially shared knowledge structures o~ emotion concepts. These 
knowledge structures comprise details about emotion eliciting 
events, along with their physiological, behaVioural, cognitive and 
social components. Consequently, an analysis o~ speci~ic emotion 
knowledge structures ~rom within the context o~ marriage - ~rom the 
cognitive construal o~ an eliciting event, to subsequent emotion and 
behaviour - has the potential to enrich our understanding o~ 
emotions both within, and beyond, the interpersonal setting. 
Emotion Prototype and Cognitive Appraisal, Analysis 
Over the last decade, researchers have begun investigating the 
layperson's knowledge structures about the nature and course o~ 
emotion. A cornerstone assumption o~ this work is that event 
appraisals and knowledge structures determine, (or at least 
in~luence), how emotions are perceived, interpreted, labelled, and 
expressed. One particularly productive approach to analysing such 
emotion knowledge structures has been derived ~rom Rosch's (1978) 
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work on prototypes, or mental representations of categories of 
objects, events~ and concepts such as emotion. Each prototype 
comprises a set o~ organized ~eatures which characterize the most 
typical instance o~ a particular category, or concept. Membership in 
a particular category is determined by resemblance, i. e. particular 
objects, events or concepts are said to be members o~ a category by 
sufficient resemblance to prototypical exemplars (Russell, 1991). 
Since resemblance (and so, category membership) is a matter of 
degree, categories tend to have fuzzy boundaries, and members 
resemble each other in overlapping and crisscrossing ways that vary 
in kind and number. 
Emotion prototypes tend to be script-like in nature, because 
emotion categories do not refer to single,discrete objects or 
events. As Russell (1991) comments, the ~eatures that constitute 
emotion concepts describe the subevents that make up the emotion: i. 
e., causes, beliefs, feelings, physiological changes, desires, overt 
actions, and vocal and ~acial expressions. Thus, to know the meaning 
of a term like anger, hate or jealousy, is to know a script for that 
emotion. Moreover, since closely related concepts like anger, hate 
and jealousy are held to share fuzzy boundaries, emotion prototype 
analysis has the potential to reveal both the shared and distinctive 
prototypical features of these emotions (e. g. eliciting events, 
physiological symptoms, urges~ behaviours, control strategies, 
etc.). 
Since the first emotion concept prototype analysis, conducted 
by Fehr and Russell (1984), a number of researchers have been 
engaged in this style of research (e. g. Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & 
O'Connor, 1987; Fehr, 1988; Fehr & Russell, in press). The 
accumulated results of these studies show that emotion prototype 
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analysis can yield a rich store o~ in~ormation and hypotheses about 
the way in which specific emotions are perceived~ interpreted, 
labelled and recalled. 
A different, but no less important, approach to the study of 
the layperson~s knowledge of emotion is concerned with cognitive 
appraisals that tend to elicit particular emotion labels. For 
example, love or liking is said to result from an interpretation 
that an event is pleasant, has positive implications for your well-
being, or for the fulfillment 0+ your needs and wishes, and has been 
caused by another (Roseman, 1984). Over the last ten years, a number 
0+ theorists have proposed their own ~ets o~ appraisal dimensions o~ 
emotion, e. g. Roseman (1984), Smith and Ellsworth (1985; 1987), 
Frijda (1986), Scherer, (1988), and Ortony and Clore (1989). Table 1 
shows a comparison of emotion appraisal criteria as suggested by 
di~ferent theorists. 
Although the cognitive appraisal models differ with respect to 
their proposed number 0+ dimensions, and the kinds of emotions for 
which they attempt to account, they also share a number of general 
features. Most theorists agree that differing perceptions of the 
pleasantness, goal relevance, degree 0+ control and agency 0+ an 
event or stimulus are important features in the elicitation of 
di+~erent emotions. 
While the number and nature of these cognitive dimensions is 
still to be determined, the real strength of the appraisal approach 
lies in its capacity to account for emotions, not simply as products 
of interruption (e. g. Berscheid, 1983), but as meaningful responses 
to goal/need/wish attainment or frustration. For example, if a 
couple are planning to go to a concert together and the husband 
arrives home so late that they cannot go, the wife may react with 
Table 1 
Comparison o~ Emotion Appraisal Criteria Suggested Qy Di~~erent 
Theorists 
Event appraisal 
1 
Novel }! 
Sudden x 
Familiar x 
Predictable x 
Pleasant x 
Goal relevant x 
(I mportant) 
Certainty x 
(Understanding) 
Goal conducive 
(Obstacles) 
>: 
E~~ort required x 
Cause~ agent 
Responsibility 
(Blame, credit) 
Cause, motive 
(Stability) 
Control 
(Power) 
v 
n' 
x 
x 
2 
x 
>: 
>: 
}: 
Theorists 
3 4 5 
>: 
>: 
}: 
}: .. '" <-
" 
}: 
>: }: " 
" 
x 
x x 
6 
" 
" 
Note. 1 = Scheret- (1988); 2 = Roseman (1984); 3 = Ft-ijda (1986); 
4 = Ortony and Clore (1989); 5 = Smith and Ellsworth (1985, 1987); 
6 = Weiner (1985). 
(Table adapted ~rom Scherer, 1988). 
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anger i~ she blames him ~or his thoughtlessness~ or with depression 
i~ she interprets the event as a re~lection o~ his lack o~ love Tor 
her. Alternately~ the wi~e may react with relier when he rinally 
arrives home, grate~ul that he has not had an accident, or even with 
contempt at his inability to be on time ~or anything. 
Clearly, cognitive appraisal analysis o~ speci~ic emotions ~its 
neatly within the more general, emotion prototype approach, in 
that an individual's interpretation o~ an event or stimulus, and 
consequent reaction to it, derives ~or the most part ~rom emotion 
script-like knowledge structures. However, despite the ~act that 
prototype and cognitive appraisal approaches apparently yield 
valuable complementary in~ormation, no research to date has utilised 
both procedures in the context o~ a particular study. 
Another important ~eature o~ both research endeavours is that 
although researchers are ~ast becoming interested in the ways in 
which emotion prototypes and cognitive appraisal patterns di~~er 
cross-culturally (e. g. Boucher & Brandt, 1981; Scherer, Wallbott & 
Summer~ield, 1986; Ellsworth, 1991), emotion script knowledge has, 
to date, been studied in a general, context-~ree ~ashion (with the 
sole exception or Smith & Ellsworth's, 1987, exam-room study>. 
Nevertheless, emotions occur within distinct social contexts (such 
as marriage) which ma~ in~luence emotion knowledge structures 
(including cognitive appraisal patterns) in a number o~ subtle ways. 
For example, when is it appropriate to get angry at your spouse? How 
should you express your anger (ir at all?) What is your partner's 
reaction likely to be? While the research emphasis remains 
predominantly global and context-~ree, we can have only vague 
guidelines as to what precipitates particular emotions, how they 
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~eel~ what kinds o~ cognitions typically precede and accompany them~ 
how they are typically expressed and controlled~ and why, and what 
their consequences are~ within close relationship settings. 
Summary 
Psychologists currently know very little about emotion in close 
relationships, other than the fact that unhappy couples tend to 
express and reciprocate more negative a~~ect (de~ined with respect 
to nonverbal behaviour) than happy couples in laboratory 
interactions. With respect to emotion elicitation~ Berscheid's 
(1983) application o~ Mandler"s (1975) interruption theory o~ 
emotion to close relationships provides a use~ul approach. 
However, Berscheid's theory is not in~ormative about the nature and 
course o~ speci+ic emotions in close relationship settings. 
Working from within a cognitive perspective~ emotion theorists 
have recently begun to explore the layperson's naive understandings 
and knowledge structures o~ speci~ic emotions. In the main~ these 
studies have taken the ~orm o~ cognitive appraisal or emotion 
prototype research. However, no research to date has combined the 
two approaches, despite the wealth o~ complementary in~ormation such 
an integrated approach would yield. Nor have researchers located 
their studies o~ speci~ic emotions within distinct social contexts~ 
despite the ~act that the socially constructed rules ~or emotional 
experience and expressibn appear likely to vary as a fUnction of 
social setting. 
Given that people constantly make use of their implicit emotion 
knowledge to understand and manage their interpersonal interactions, 
it seems clear that emotion prototype and cognitive appraisal data, 
gathered from within a marital setting~ could provide a rich fund of 
in~ormation and hypotheses about emotions in close relationships. 
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The present studies attempt to provide such a set o~ data. 
The Current Research Programme 
As I have attempted to make clear, our knowledge and 
understanding o~ the ordinary, everyday emotional li~e o~ married 
couples is minimal and ~ragmentary. Consequently, the overall aims 
o~ thi~ research programme were two~old. The ~irst aim was to 
extend our knowledge o~ speci~ic emotions in marriage by making a 
detailed, prototype and cognitive appraisal analysis o~ ~our, 
interpersonally relevant emotions: love, hate, anger and jealo~sy. 
The second aim was to identi~y the shared and unique prototypical and 
cognitive appraisal ~eatures of all four emotions, and to compare 
the emotion pro~iles obtained in this speci~ic, marit~l setting, 
with the context-~ree pro~iles obtained ~rom previous research. Each 
o~ these aims is discussed in greater detail below. 
Emotion Frequency and Which Emotions? 
Recent studies o~ emotion in people's everyday lives (e. g. 
Averill, 1982; Scherer, Wallbott & Summer~ield, 1986), indicate that 
anger (and its variants, e. g. annoyance, irritation) is a 
frequently experienced, interpersonally relevant emotion. Similarly, 
recent marital interaction research (e. g. Bradbury, 1989; Fletcher 
& Fitness, 1990), suggest that anger is a highly relevant emotion in 
couples' problem solving discussions. However, the typical frequency 
and intensity of this and other emotions in the lives o~ married 
couples is still an unexplored issue. 
Accordingly, I began this series o~ studies by having married 
subjects rate how ~requently and intensely they ~elt love, hate, 
anger and jealousy towards their partners. These emotion labels were 
chosen, ~irst, on the basis o~ their ~requency o~ mention in both 
the Fitness & Fletcher (1990) dating study, and in sel~-report 
reviews o~ laboratory-based~ marital interactions (Fletcher & 
Fitness, 1990). Second, emotion prototype studies (e. g. Shaver et 
al., 1987) have demonstrated that laypeople rate these speci~ic 
emotion labels as highly prototypical examples o~ the concept o~ 
emotion. Thus, it seemed likely that married subjects would be able 
to relate easily to these particular emotion labels. 
Prototype Analysis o~ Love, Hate. Anqet- and Jealousy 
The major aim o~ this research programme was to make a 
detailed prototype and cognitive appraisal analysis o~ love, hate, 
anger and jealousy in marriage. As previously noted, in their 
landmark study o~ emotion prototypes~ Shaver et ala (1987) ~ound 
that love, anger, hate and jealousy were ranked respettively ~irst, 
second, third and sixth (out o~ a total o~ 213 emotion words) as 
representing good examples o~ emotions. However, research and theory 
related to these ~our emotions gives a muddied and inconclusive 
picture of their associated prototypes, both within close 
relationship contexts and across domains. For example, while the 
emotion o~ anger has been increasingly investigated (e. g. Averill, 
1982; Scherer et al., 1986; Shaver et al., 1987; Ben-Zur & Breznitz, 
1991), no surveyor prototype studies have explored anger ~rom 
within a speci~ic, relational context (e. g. between married 
couples). Moreover, only Oavitz (1969) has attempted to isolate 
those prototypical ~eatures that distinguish between the experience 
o~ anger, hate and jealousy. In his stUdy o~ the language o~ 
emotion, Davitz ~ound that while the layperson characterised both 
anger and hate as involving tension, hyperactivation, an impulse to 
move against (hit out) and helplessness, hate was also characterised 
by a ~eeling o~ incompetence, or weakness (blaming the sel~), and 
discom~ort (inner ache). Un~ortunately, the prototypical ~eatures 
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obtained ~or jealousy were identical to those obtained ~or hate. 
Thus, while these emotion pro~iles are in~ormative, their 
constituent categories are too broad to allow use~ul comparisons 
between the three negative emotions. 
Despite the dearth o~ research~ a plethora o~ con~licting 
speculations has been advanced concerning how anger, hate and 
jealousy concepts might be related. For example, some theorists have 
proposed that hate is merely a personalized version o~ anger (e. g. 
Arieti~ 1970; Frijda, 1986), while others have claimed that hate is 
a variant o~ the more primitive emotion o~ disgust (Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 1987). This is an important distinction, because 
the emotion o~ disgust typically comprises an urge to' escape, or be 
rid o~, the disgusting object (Rozin & Fallon, 1987), whereas anger 
comprises an urge to engage with, or con~ront an obstacle (Averill, 
1982). In an early study o~ the di~~erences between the emotion 0+ 
~ngBr ~nd tha d~v~lgpmmnt gf hg§tl1~ ~ttity~pa, M'K§ll~r (19~Q) 
~ound subjects tended to ~eel hate when it was not expedient to 
express anger, and also claimed that people ~eel the most hatred +or 
those who bully and humiliate them, implying an imbalance o~ power. 
However, Solomon (1981) stated that true hatred can only exist 
between equals - otherwise it is contempt (when one perceives 
onesel~ to be superior), or resentment (in~erior). 
The situation with jealousy is also complicated, in that some 
theorists consider it to be a primary a~~ective response that o~ten 
occurs with a minimum o~ cognitive work (Buunk & Bringle, 1987), 
while other theorists consider jealousy to be a secondary, or 
compound emotion, the components o~ which are yet to be determined. 
For example, Plutchik (1980) proposes jealousy to be a complex 
mixture o~ the basic emotions o~ ~ear and anger; Panksepp (1982) 
proposes a combination o~ panic~ rage and expectancy; Sharpsteen (in 
press) proposes Jealousy is composed o~ anger~ ~ear and sorrow~ and 
so on. For theorists o~ this persuasion~ Jealousy is not a unique 
emotional state that requires its own emotion word (Hupka, 1984)~ 
but a complex syndrome o~ primary emotions plus cognitive 
evaluations, elaborAtions and b&h~viDUri~ th~t inform a parmen he or 
she is experiencing something society calls jealousy. 
Even love is not exempt ~rom theoretical speculation about its 
status as a real emotion. For example, Liebowitz (1983) described 
love as being the "stt-ongest positive ~eeling we can have" (p. 48), 
and Sommers (1984) ~ound 85% o~ her American subjects enjoyed 
experiencing love more than any other emotion (including joy). 
However~ as with hate and jealousy, some theorists do not consider 
love (as opposed to lust) to be a ~undamental emotion. For example, 
Kemper (1987) claims that love is not a basic emotion because it 
cannot be autonomically di~~erentiated ~rom happiness, and Frijda 
(1986), quoting Spinoza, claims that love is merely happiness with 
the object known - that is, a personalised version o~ happiness. 
Nonetheless~ such claims con~lict with prototype research that has 
shown the concept o~ love to be distinguishable ~rom both happiness 
(Shaver et al., 1987) and commitment (Fehr, 1988). 
A critical point worth emphasizing here is that emotion 
prototype research is ~oncerned with the layperson's knowledge 
structures, or concepts~ o~ emotions, rather than with biological 
structures per se. Thus, analysis o~ the layperson's knowledge 
structures about love, hate, anger and jealousy cannot resolve 
debates about the basicness or otherwise o~ emotions on a biological 
level. However, a thorough-going analysis o~ these structures can 
reveal the shared and unique ~eatuFes o~ di~~eFent emotion concepts, 
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and delineate the subtle interrelationships between them. Thus~ one 
o~ the major aims o~ this series o~ studies was to pin down ~or the 
~irst time~ and in some detail~ married subjects' prototypical 
knowledge structures involving recalled incidents o~ love (as 
opposed to lust, or passion), hate, anger and jealousy in their 
relationships. In particular, I ~ocused on the extent to which hate, 
anger and jealousy possess distinctive prototypes, and sought to 
isolate those ~eatures (e. g. events or urges, symptoms or 
behaviours)~ that best distinguished between these emotions within a 
marital context. An additional aim was related to the importance o~ 
context in the derivation of emotion prototypes, and involved 
comparing the emotion prototypes obtained within a marital context 
with context-~ree emotion accounts ~rom previous research (e. g. 
McKellar, 1950: Scherer et al., 1986; Shaver et al., 1987). 
Cognitive Appraisal Analysis o~ Love, Hate, Anger and Jealousy 
As with prototype research~ cognitive appraisal studies (with 
the exception of Smith & Ellsworth's~ 1987, exam room study>, have 
examined the layperson's knowledge o~ emotion eliciting events in a 
context-free fashion. For example, anger is said to be elicited by 
the perception o~ an other-caused, negative event, involving a high 
level o~ perceived obstacles (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a). However, i~ 
such a broadly categorized event were to occur within the context o~ 
marriage, anyone of a' number of negative emotions (e. g. hate~ hurt 
ot- ~rustration) might be sel~-attributed, rather than anger per sea 
Clearly, more specific in~ormation is required about the event, the 
prototypical ~eatures, and the cognitive appraisal patterns that 
take the marital setting into account be~ore the likely sel~ 
attributed emotion can be predicted with con~idence. 
Consequently, along with making a detailed prototypical 
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analysis o~ love, hate, anger and jealousy in this series o~ 
studies, I also examined the degree to which subjects could 
discriminate between these emotions on the basis o~ cognitive 
appraisal dimensions within a marital context. Naturally, I expected 
the cognitive appraisal pattern ~or love to be readily discriminated 
~rom the negative emotions, and to comprise dimensions similar to 
those ~ound by Roseman (1984), and Ellsworth and Smith (1988b). 
Thus, subjects appraising a love eliciting event were hypothesized 
to ~ind it pleasant~ other-caused, and motivationally consistent. 
Similarly, subjects appraising an anger eliciting event were 
hypothesized to ~ind it unpleasant, other-caused, and involving a 
high level of perceived obstacles (Smith & Ellsworth~ 1985). 
However, given the lack of previous cognitive appraisal research 
into hate and jealousy, I had no speci~ic hypotheses regarding their 
cognitive appraisal patterns. 
In order to increase the chances o~ identifying relevant 
cognitive dimensions ~or the Tour emotions, as well as 
distinguishing between them, a comprehensive range oT cognitive 
appraisal dimensions was selected, including most oT those described 
in Table 1. These dimensions were: pleasantness o~ the event; 
motivational consistency (was the event bene~icial to the 
relationship?); importance OT the event; ability to understand the 
event; predictability'o~ the event~s course; level of perceived 
obstacles associated with the event <interference with goals, plans, 
wishes); degree o~ anticipated ef~ort required to cope, or deal with 
the event; responsibility (credit or blameworthiness) for the event 
(sel~ and partner); perceived degree o~ control (power) over the 
event (self and partner); typicality of the event; and event 
expectedness. Also, given the propensity o~ married couples to 
32 
believe their partners directly cause their emotions (Ellis~ 1961), 
three causal dimensions were included Tor each emotion (seIT, 
partner or circumstances), as distinct Trom who was to blame (or 
could take credit) Tor the eliciting event. The Tinal dimension 
involved the perceived stability of the emotion~s cause (for 
example, whether or not one partner caused the other to ~eel loving 
because he or she was simply a wonderTul person). 
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OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
In Study 1, married subjects provided ~requency and intensity 
data on ~our emotions (love, hate, anger and jealousy) in their 
relationships. Subjects then provided detailed~ retrospective, 
prototypical and cognitive appraisal accounts ~or love, hate, anger 
and jealou5Y from their awn r.latiQn$hip~~ Th~ aim was to ~Qn5tru~t 
pro~iles ~or each emotion, and to ascertain the extent to which the 
prototypical and cognitive appraisal ~eatures distinguished between 
the emotions. 
In line with similar emotion prototype and survey studies (e. 
g. Scherer et al., 1986; Shaver et al., 1987), I designed a 
questionnaire that led married subjects through recalled accounts of 
their emotional experiences, including details of their prior mood, 
continuing through details of the eliciting event, and ending with 
their mood after the incident was over. Cued questions relating to 
physiological symptoms, verbal and behavioural expression, 
cognitions during the event, urges, control strategies, and partner 
reactions were included. The questionnaire also comprised a number 
of forced choice questions relating to such variables as emotion 
duration, and several scales measuring subjects' remembered 
appraisals of the event (including emotional intensity). 
I conducted a further three studies to test the validity o~ the 
results ~rom the main stUdy. In Study 2, married subjects wrote 
hypothetical accounts of the most typical love, hate, anger and 
jealousy incidents they could imagine occurring in a marital 
relationship. The purpose of this exercise was to test the 
hypothesis that subjects would draw upon the same kinds of emotion 
knowledge structures when recalling an actual emotional event, as 
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they would when imagining a typical emotional event. O~ course~ 
recalled accounts were expected to include a wider range o~ 
idiosyncratic ~eatures than hypothetical accounts. Nevertheless, i~ 
it is the case that emotion knowledge is represented in the ~orm o~ 
widely held scripts, or prototypes, then the two kinds o~ account 
should be similar. 
The purpose of Study 3 was to investigate tha role of perceivad 
causal locus on emotions and cognitive appraisal patterns. Subjects 
imagined they were experiencing an emotion (either love, hate, anger 
or jealousy) toward their partner in their own relationship, and 
that the emotion had been caused either by something to do with 
themselves, their partner, or some external circumstance. Subjects 
then wrote about the kind o~ event they had imagined and rated the 
cognitive appraisals along the same dimensions as used in Study 1. I 
also planned to check the validity o~ the appraisal results ~rom the 
first study by combining the three causal conditions for each 
emotion, and comparing the cognitive appraisal patterns with those 
obtained in Study 1. 
In the ~inal study, the procedLn-~in Study 1 was e~fectively 
reversed, in order to further test the validity of the prior 
results. Subjects were given combinations o~ the most relevant 
prototypical ~eatures and cognitive appraisal dimensions gathered 
from the first study ~br the emotions o~ love, hate, anger and 
jealousy~ and were required to select the correct matching emotions. 
The emotion label "happiness" was also included as an emotion option 
in this study, to test whether subjects could discriminate between 
love and happiness, as well as between hate, anger and jealousy, on 
the basis o~ the prototypical and/or cognitive appraisal in~ormation 
gathered ~rom Study 1. 
Study 1 
The ~irst task in this study was to gather preliminary data 
about the typical ~requency and intensity o~ love~ hate~ anger and 
jealousy in married couples· lives. The second task was to obtain 
detailed accounts o~ prototypical knowledge structures (including 
cognitive appraisal patterns) ~or recalled incidents o~ love (as 
opposed to lust, or passion), hate, anger and jealousy in marital 
relationships. In particular, I sought to determine the e~tent to 
which the three negative emotions possess distinct prototypes, and 
to identi~y those ~eatures (e. g. events or urges, symptoms or 
behaviours~) and cognitive appraisal patterns that best 
disting~ished between them within a ~lose relatignship context. 
I also planned to compare the emotion prototypes obtained ~rom 
within a marital context with context-~ree accounts o~ emotions Trom 
previous research (e. g. McKellar, 1950; Scherer et al., 1986; 
Shaver et al.~ 1987). 
Method 
Subjects 
One hundred and sixty married subjects participated in this 
study, 80 males and 80 Temales. The mean age o~ the sample was 35 
years (.?d = 9.7 years, and the mean t-elat ionship length was 10.7 
years (sd = 8.5 years). Fi~ty tht-ee subjects wet-e rect-uited ~rom the 
student population at the University OT Canterbury, while the 
remainder came ~rom the wider community. The latter group were 
spouses, ~riends or relations OT the University sample. 
Procedure Overview 
A~ter being welcomed to the laboratory, subjects were given a 
brie~ overview oT the tasks they were to complete, along with an 
assurance that their responses were anonymous and conTidential. 
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Subjects then provided demographic data, and rated the +requency and 
intensity 0+ love, anger, hate and jealousy in their marriages (see 
Appendix 1). Subjects also completed a number 0+ individual 
di++erence measures, theoretically unrelated to the main thrust 0+ 
the research programme (see Appendix 2). 
A+ter a short co++ee break, subjects were given a two part 
questionnaire, randomly chosen +rom the questionnaires +or love, 
hate, anger and jealousy (20 males and 20 +emales +or each emotion). 
Subjects read the instructions and completed the questionnaire 
(approximately 45 minutes). Finally, subjects were thoroughly 
debriefed about the aims of the study and thanked for their 
participation. Subjects also provided their addresses in order that 
a results report could be posted to them. This report was duly 
posted a+ter the results had been analysed. 
Measures (see Appendix 3). 
Emotion Questionnaire: Part 1. The basic +ormat 0+ this 
questionnaire remained the same for all four emotions. Subjects 
were instructed to relax, and to try and remember the most recent 
time they had felt either love, hate, anger or jealousy (even if 
only mildly) for their partner. They were asked to recall as many 
details 0+ the eliciting event as possible, and to answer the 
questions according to how they +elt at the time, and not with 
respect to how they currently interpreted the event. Subjects were 
then asked open-ended questions about various aspects 0+ the 
emotional experience: when the incident had happened; prior and post 
mood; details of the eliciting event; remembered cognitions, verbal 
expressions, physiological symptoms, urges, behaviours and control 
strategies, emotion duration, and partner reaction. 
Part £: Subjects then rated how intense the emotion had been on 
a 6 pt. Likert scale (end pts. not at all and extremely), and 
completed a ~urther 13 6 pt. Likert scale items measuring their 
appraisals o~ the eliciting event on the ~ollowing dimensions: 
pleasantness, importance~ expectedness, motivational consistency 
(was it good ~or your relationship?), certainty o~ understanding the 
event~ amount o~ e~~ort required to deal with the event, level o~ 
perceived obstacles, predictability o~ the event's course, 
responsibility ~or the event (credit ~or love, blame ~or the 
negative emotions), perceived amount o~ control over the event (sel~ 
and partner), and the event"s typicality_ Subjects also rated the 
causal locus o~ the emotion (sel~, partner and circumstances), and 
rated the extent to which they believed the cause would be speci~ic 
to that one situation (globality). 
Coding o~ Prototcols 
Initially, each ~ree response answer ~or the 15 questions was 
analysed and subcategorized into the classifications shown in Table 
3. The aim was to construct a conCise, in~ormative coding scheme 
that would provide a use~ul number of discriminatory categories 
without being either under or over inclusive. Two coders then 
independently examined all 160 transcripts and categorized the 
replies according to the Coding Scheme. 
A high level of interrater reliability (above 91%) was achieved 
over all the categories, including the moods and emotions coded 
according to the revised Emotion Coding Scheme (Fitness ~ Fletcher, 
1990). Cognitions coding (positive or negative; sel~, partner, third 
party or relationship directed) achieved a very high level o~ 
reliability (96%). The least reliably coded categories pertained to 
type o~ event (91%). All disagreements were resolved in discussion. 
Results 1 
Frequency and Intensity o-f Love, Hate. Anqet- and Jealousy in 
E.!dBl§'.f,:tEi"':" B..§.L.:t..~ . tp n s h i Q.2. 
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Table 2 displays the means and intercorrelations between 
emotion -frequency and intensity -for love, hate, anger and jealousy 
in subjects' marital relationships. Clearly, love was the most 
-frequently experienced emotion, with anger -following close behind. 
Jealousy and hate were the least -frequently experienced emotions. 
With respect to intensity, the same order applied; thus, as would be 
expected, the correlations between reported -frequency and intensity 
for the -four emotions were all signi-ficant and positive. 
Love, Hate. Anger and ;Jealousy Questionnaire Results 
In general, subjects wrote richly detailed emotion accounts, 
including a wealth o-f unsolicited explanations and attributions for 
the causes o-f the emotion. The mean number o-f words over all -four 
emotions was 340 (sd = 180), with hate accounts being the longest (1::1 
:::: 362.4 words, sd = 167.6), and anger accounts bei ng the shot-test (M 
= 226.8 words, sd = 148.5). 
Intensity o-f Emotional E}:pet-ience 
Be-fore investigating the emotion questionnaire data, I analysed 
emotion intensity to ensure it was uni-form across the recalled love, 
hate, anger and jealousy experiences. In -fact, all -four emotions had 
been experienced at moderate to high levels o-f intensity, with means 
ranging from 4.3 to 4.9 (with 6 being the maximum possible 
intensity). The results o-f a one-way ANOVA showed no signi-ficant 
dif-ference in intensity between the emotions. However, as might be 
expected, emotion intensity was positively related to emotion 
duration -for all -four emotions (L :::: .29, g<.OOl). 
":~'n 
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Table 2 
t1eans and Intet-con"elations Between Emotion Frequenc.Y. and Intensity 
ror Love, Hate. Anger and Jealousy (n = 160) 
Emotion Frequency Mean SD Intensity Mean SD 
Love 4.4 0.9 4.0 1.2 6 ', • .L. 
Anger 2.9 0.8 2.6 1.1 .63 
Jealousy 2.1 1.0 2.1 1.2 .71 
Hate 1.6 0.8 1.6 1.1 .67 
Note. Scale ranges were 1 - 6. 
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Emotion Pro-files 
Table 3 shows the per~entage frequency of responses Dyer the 
major question categories -for the -four emotions o-f love, hate, anger 
and jealousy. It should be noted that not every subject answered 
every question, and many subjects gave multiple answers that -fell 
into two or more categories (except for discrete questions such as 
emo,tion duration, or el iciting event). Consequently, no attempt was 
made to make statistical comparisons between the emotion pro-files, 
because the majority o-f categories -failed to meet the assumptions 
-for Chi Square analysis (no zero cell sizes or expected -frequencies 
less than -five). Nevertheless, as Table 3 illustrates, distinct 
patterns -for each o-f the emotions were obtained. 
Love pro-file. Recalled love events tended to have occurred very 
recently <72.5% within the past month). While most subjects reported 
-feeling happy or relaxed be-fore the incident, those subjects who 
reported -feeling tense or anxious explained that they had been in 
some kind o-f trouble, and their partner had given them help and 
support to cope with it. For example, a 25 year old lab technician 
wrote this account: 
"An experiment had gone wrong at work and I didn~t 
know what I was going to do next with my sample. I 
didn~t want to con-front the boss, and I worked myself 
up into a real state. I told my husband, who works in 
the same division, that I just didn't know what to do. 
He took control o-f the situation and made me -feel a 
lot better about mysel-f and my capabilities, and said 
he'd sort the problem out with my boss. I thought how 
special he was, that he understands me, knows \r~hat r 
am like, and is prepared to be there and help." 
Table 3 
Jealousy 
1 - 7 days 
1 - 4 weeks 
1 6 months 
7 - 12 months 
1 2 years 
Over 2 years 
Prio,~ Mood 
E>:cited, alert 
An>:ious 
Tense, stressed 
Happy 
Calm, rela>:ed 
Depressed 
Event 
Thinking about partner 
P. giving time, support 
Sharing happy times 
Giving to partner 
Badly treated by p. 
Humiliated by p. 
Disgusted by p. 
In-fidelity 
Treated un-fairly by p. 
P. caring -for others 
P. receiving bene-fits 
Betrayed, lied to by p. 
P. attn. to opp. sex 
Cognitions 
Positive, sel-f 
Positive, partner 
Positive, reI' ship 
Negative, sel-F 
Negative, partner 
Negative, reI' ship 
Negative, 3rd party 
Other emotions reported 
Frustration 
Am:iety 
Hurt 
Happiness 
Love Hate 
45 22.5 
27.5 7.5 
17.5 2"1.5 
12.5 
2.5 12.5 
7.5 17.5 
7.5 17.5 
22.5 15 
12.5 22.5 
52.5 30 
27.5 
40 2.5 
22.5 
22.5 
15 
50 
15 
12.5 
5 
10 
2.5 
2.5 
50 27.5 
100 10 
80 12.5 
25 72.5 
100 
10 35 
15 
12.5 
12.5 
22.5 
1.1·:1, 
Anger Jealousy 
42.5 
25 15 
15 32.5 
7.5 10 
10 
7.5 32.5 
27.5 
25 
27.5 15 
12.5 47.5 
45 22.5 
15 7.5 
27.5 
5 
7.5 
12.5 
47.5 
5 12.5 
5 12.5 
2.5 7.5 
55 
7.5 5 
22.5 
15 
32.5 100 
100 100 
10 15 
60 
7.5 5 
5 20 
12.5 22.5 
Table 3 continued 
Urges 
To be physically close 
To express verbally 
To leave situation 
To take revenge 
To physically hurt p. 
To hurt third party 
Not reported 
Verbal Expression 
Sympathetic 
Joking 
Hostile Expression 
Calm discussion 
Say nothing 
Physiological Symptoms 
Butter~lies in stomach 
Tight stomach 
Sick stomach 
Relal':ed muscles 
Tense muscles 
Warmth or heat 
Heart palpitations 
Headache 
Agitated~ restless 
No symptoms 
Behaviour 
Hug, kiss 
Give presents 
Act coldly, withdraw 
Yell, throw things 
Worry, brood 
Try to resolve 
Walk out, leave 
Physically hurt p. 
Talk to ~riends 
Behave as usual 
Partner Reaction 
Loving, happy 
Angry 
Hurt 
SLwprised 
Sorry, remorse~ul 
Hateful 
62.5 
20 
17.5 
62.5 
5 
27.5 
25 
20 
7 
20 
10 
35 
62.5 
25 
92.5 
25 
40 
15 
12.5 
17.5 
35 
17.5 
47.5 
30 
17.5 
50 
12.5 
12.5 
15 
37.5 
25 
10 
10 
7.5 
2.5 
27.5 
32.5 
22.5 
12.5 
12.5 
57.5 
5 
2.5 
7.5 
27.5 
47.5 
30 
22.5 
30 
70 
22.5 
10 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
45 
5 
7.5 
7.5 
22.5 
35 
5 
15 
30 
17.5 
12.5 
2.5 
17.5 
20 
10 
22.5 
27.5 
40 
10 
47.5 
47.5 
22.5 
15 
35 
17.5 
22.5 
17.5 
20 
15 
17.5 
52.5 
10 
7.5 
17.5 
Table 3 continued 
Duration 
Seconds, minutes 
Hours 
Days, weeks 
Mood A-fterward~ 
Calm, rela>:ed 
Happy, lovi ng 
Relieved 
Hw-t 
Depressed 
An>: ious 
Frustrated 
Tense stressed 
Control 
Yes 
No 
Reason -for No Control 
Want partner to know 
No reason to control 
Too intense 
Healthier to express 
Reason -for Control 
Destructive emotion 
15 
45 
40 
55 
50 
12.5 
12.5 
87.5 
40 
39 
6 
Others present 100 
Always control -feelings 
Fear p's. reaction 
Means o-f control 
Cognitive~ reappraisal 40 
Switching o-f-f, ignoring 20 
Behavioural . 40 
Note. P. stands -for partner. 
37.5 
40 
22.5 
15 
2" c L • .J 
22.5 
20 
10 
5 
75 
25 
40 
20 
20 
20 
45 
20 
10 
4 7 ~, 
17 
30 
62.5 
30 
5 
22 .. 5 
20 
25 
17.5 
27.5 
72.5 
27.5 
54 
36 
10 
45 
24 
10 
18 
45 
24 
24 
27.5 
35 
35 
27.5 
50 
10 
20 
7.5 
7 
77.5 
22.5 
78 
'")'") 
LL 
81 
19 
55 
19 
26 
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Love events appear to have involved a good deal o~ positive 
thinking about the self, partner and relationship. These findings 
are consistent with the results o~ Shaver et al. (1987) and Fehr 
(1988), who ~ound subjects in love to be obsessed with the thought 
o~ the loved one. Clearly, this kind o~ thinking is a potent 
elicitor o~ ~eelings o~ love. Subjects ~eeling love did not report 
any particular physiological symptoms with great ~requency, although 
25% mentioned having butterflies in the stomach. However~ there was 
a de~inite action tendency, or urge to be physically close to their 
partners, an urge which Shaver et ala (1987) ~ound distinguished the 
love prototype ~rom joy. It is interesting to note the large 
proportion o~ subjects who claimed the emotion lasted ~or days (or 
even weeks); prototcol analysis indicated that while ~or some 
subjects this meant a literal awareness o~ the ~eeling o~ being "in 
love" over an extended period, ~or others it meant having a positive 
attitude towards the partner with a low level of affective arousal. 
As might be expected, most subjects expressed their ~eelings to 
their partners, whose reactions were overwhelmingly positive. Only 
five subjects made a conscious effort to control the expression of 
their emotion, because there were other people present and subjects 
~elt expression would be inappropriate. The 35 subjects who did not 
try to control the exp~ession o~ their emotion either wanted their 
partner to know how they felt, or could not see any good reason to 
control the emotion. 
Hate profile. Naturally, remembered hate accounts contained a 
number o~ ~eatures that were the opposite o~ those reported in the 
love accounts, e. g. they tended to be less recent, (so presumably 
less ~requent), and only one subject claimed that merely thinking 
about their partner elicited hate. While hal~ the subjects had been 
Feeling happy or relaxed beFore the hate eliciting incident, some 
32.5% ~elt stressed or anxious, and 27.5% ~elt depressed (a higher 
level than that recorded be~ore the anger and jealousy incidents). 
In the main, subjects ~eeling hate tended to have been neglected, 
unsupported or badly treated by their partners. An example o~ being 
badly treated comes ~rom a 22 year old married student, writing 
about an event that had occurred a year and a halF previously: 
"I contt-acted a pat-ticularly nasty venereal in~ection 
From my partner. What made me ~eel hatred was the 
Fact that my partner did not tell me there was any 
such danger, and i~ she had told me, then th~ whole 
incident could easily have been avoided. I ~elt she 
was only thinking o~ hersel~, and not also o~ me. I 
~elt like I had been experimented on. She had put my 
health at risk without telling me." 
Other examples included being ignored or not listened to, and 
incidents that made the subject ~eel alone and uncared For. The 
second most Frequently reported hate eliciting event was being 
humiliated or embarrassed by the partner; when reported by women, 
such incidents were typically alcohol related and occurred at social 
gatherings, whereas men typically reported being embarrassed by 
their wi~e>s "making a !5cene" in public. 
Reported cognitions were almost exclusively negative about the 
partner, e>:cept For a Few ~orgiving thoughts (e. g. "He's not always 
like this"). However, there was also a substantial percentage o~ 
selF-related negative cognitions, e. g. "I knew I was handling it 
badly", and "I despised mysel~ For being so weak". A ~el" subjects 
had sel~-related positive cognitions (e. g. "I could ~ind someone 
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better than this!"). The most ~requently reported emotions other 
than hate were ~rustration, hurt and anxiety. 
Although Davitz (1969) claimed the action tendency typical o~ 
hate involved moving against the other, the most usual urge in these 
accounts was to leave the situation and avoid the partner - the 
direct opposite o~ the action tendency ~or love (wanting to approach 
the partner). Only a ~ew subjects wanted to take revenge (e. g. by 
getting back at their partner in some way), while an even smaller 
number expressed an urge to physically hurt the partner (e. g. to 
punch, hit or kick them). The desire to get away suggests hate 
involves an aversion response somewhat akin to disgust, which Oatley 
and Johnson-Laird (1987) hypothesize is closely related to hate. In 
accord with the urge to escape the situation, nearly hal~ the 
subjects said nothing o~ their ~eelings to their partner, and a 
SUbstantial number either pretended nothing was wrong and behaved 
as usual, or acted coldly and withdrew emotionally ~rom their 
partners. In the main, the consequences o~ hate were destructive, 
with the most ~requently reported partner reactions being anger and 
hurt. Hate also tended to last longer than anger. 
Anger pro~ile. Unlike the hate eliciting events, anger 
eliciting events tended to have occurred recently. Subjects were 
generally ~airly relaxed or happy be~ore the incident, though 27.5% 
reported ~eeling stres~ed. As other researchers have ~ound (e. g. 
Averill, 1982; Scherer et al., 1986; Shaver et al., 1987), the most 
usual anger elicitor was the perception o~ having been treated 
un~airly, or unjustly. In general, these kinds o~ events were 
readily distinguishable ~rom simply having been treated badly (which 
tended to elicit hate), although occasionally the di~~erence was one 
o~ degree. For example, in one hate account the subject described an 
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incident where her husband had made jokes about her appearance. 
Although there was an element o~ un~airness in this insulting 
incident, the overwhelming perception appeared to be that he just 
"didn't care". Conversely, another subject was extremely angry 
because his wi~e re~used to change her schedule so that he could 
have the car one particular evening, and a major ~actor in his anger 
was his perception that he always went "out o~ his way" to assist 
her, and consequently, he deserved better treatment. Another example 
comes ~rom a 23 year old student in a de ~acto relationship, writing 
about an incident that had happened one week previously: 
"We were at a party having a good time, and mingling 
with everyone. I was sitting talking with t~o male 
~riends, cramped on a chair. My partner later accused 
me o~ leading them on, as one guy had his arm around me. 
Being ~alsely accused made me angry; as there was no room 
to move, the action was harmless, as the guy had nowhere 
else to put his arm. I thought his accusation was 
ridiculous. It made me ~eel as i~ I had done something 
wrong, but why would I purposely try to hurt my partner 
like that?" 
Other examples included subjects being blamed ~or accidents, 
being expected to do more than their ~air share o~ chores, and not 
having an equal say in' decision making. Physiologically, there were 
no major di~~erences between hate and anger, except that anger 
involved more muscle tension and a ~eeling o~ being hot and 
bothered. However, an interesting contrast between the hate and 
anger accounts was that subjects tended to engage with their 
partners (albeit negatively) rather than withdraw ~rom them in 
response to an anger eliciting event. Shaver et al. (1987) also 
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while only 141. brooded, or withdrew. Interestingly, however, while 
partners tended to be angry in return, this was the only emotion ~or 
which some partners expressed remorse or regret. 
Jealousy pro~ile. In general, jealousy eliciting incidents had 
not happened recently, with 42.51. having occurred over a year 
previously. Subjects appeared to be more aroused be~ore the jealousy 
eliciting incident than with the other three emotions, ~eeling 
either excited~ stressed or anxious, Most of the subjects who 
reported ~eeling excited also reported ~eeling happy, probably 
because the jealousy eliciting incident ~requently happened at a 
pleasant social gathering, such as a party. 
The most ~requently reported jealousy eliciting event was not 
actual in~idelity, but involved the partner paying attention, or 
giving time to a member o~ the opposite sex. This situation often 
elicited extreme jealousy when the third party was the partner's ex-
spouse, as the following example -from a 22 year old ~emale in a de 
facto relationship illustrates: 
"My partner's ex-wife at-rived in town and asked to 
meet him for a drink. She asked him to come back 
to her (as I suspected!), and he basically told her 
that things were de~initely over. This did not 
prevent me ~eeling extremely upset and jealous. 
Firstly, bec~use she thought she could contact him 
out o~ the blue. Secondly, she is attractive. Thirdly, 
because I will never know precisely what went through 
his mind while he talked to her. I felt he was disloyal. 
I knew she wanted him back, and I wondered what games she 
would play to attempt this. I felt very insecure". 
O~ all the rour emotions~ jealousy elicited the largest number 
o~ selr-related negative cognitions, most o~ which involved sel~ 
condemnation ~or being paranoid and insecure, or which entailed 
making invidious comparisons between the sel~ and the third party. 
Many sel~-related cognitions were concerned with the assumed 
"ine>:cusability" o~ being jealous, e. g. "I'm being stupid", and 
"I'm a rool ~or not trusting her". Perhaps as a consequence o~ this, 
very ~ew subjects expressed their ~eelings to their partners 
directly, despite a ~requent desire to do so. Rather, they talked 
with ~riends, or withdrew emotionally and worried about the 
situation. Nevertheless, the ~act that partner reactions tended to 
be positive meant that partners were catching on somehow to how 
their partners were ~eeling, and were clearly making an e~~ort to 
reassure them. The majority or subjects ~elt sick with jealousy, and 
subjects also reported ~eeling hurt, anxiety and rrustration. Nearly 
a third or subjects reported wanting to tell their pa~tners how they 
relt, but only a rew subjects reported wanting to take revenge on 
their partner or to physically hurt them. However, some 17.5% o~ 
subjects reported a desire to physically hurt the third party (e. g. 
"to rip his head o~~"). 
For all three negative emotions, the most popular control 
strategies were either cognitive (trying to think about something 
else, ~ocusing on positive aspects or the partner, etc.), or 
behavioural (doing something else, distracting themselves in some 
way). Within the cognitive category, a surprising number or subjects 
explained in detail how they reappraised or reinterpreted a 
situation in order to ~eel difrerently about it. Clearly, a 
substantial number Or laypeople have an intuitive understanding o~ 
the relationship between their thoughts and their emotions. However, 
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a good number o~ subjects also mentioned simply "switching o~~" 
their ~eeling5~ without describing their strategies. Given the 
similar percentages across emotions ~or each o~ these means Or 
control, it appears that people may employ similar methods of 
emotion regulation, whatever the emotion happens to be. 
Cognitive eRQLEisal Dimensions 
Table 4 displays the mean appraisal ratings ror love, hate, 
anger and jealousy. As expected, several sets o~ means showed 
signi~icant di~~erences: Love was the most pleasant emotion, and 
jealousy was the least pleasant; love was also rated as being the 
most bene~icial to the relationship, while hate and anger were the 
1 benericial. Hate events had the least predictable course, 
while anger events were the most predictable; jealousy events were 
the hardest to understand, and love events were the easiest. Love 
events were also the least e~~ort~ul and involved the ~ewest 
perceived obstacles, as opposed to hate events, and subjects 
reporting love and anger events perceived themselves to have more 
situational control than the jealousy or hate sUbjects. Love events 
were rated more highly than the other emotions on the role o~ the 
selr in causing the emotion, while jealousy had the lowest partner 
cause and the highest external cause ratings. Jealousy was also 
rated as having the most situationally speci~ic cause, while love 
was rated as having the most global cause; jealousy events were 
rated as the most atypical, while love events were considered the 
most global. 
Looking at the three negative emotions only, there were ~ive 
sets Or signi~icantly di~~erent appraisal means: Anger had the most 
predictable course, the lowest level or perceived obstacles, and the 
highest levels or selr control, as opposed to hate events, and the 
Table 4 
Appraisal Dimension Means ~or Love, Hate, Anger and Jealousy 
Appraisal Love Hate Anger Jealousy 
Intense 4.9 4.4 4.3 4.7 2.4 1.1 
Pleasant 5.4 1.9 2.1 1.7 132.9*** 1.5 
Important 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.4 .3 .3 
E>~pected 3.5 3.9 3.3 3.6 .8 1.0 
Bene-ficial 5.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 53.4*** 1.9 
Typical 4.8 3.6 4.2 3.5 6.6*** 2.4 
Pt-edictable 4.0 3. 1 4.3 3.8 4.4*** 6 '":'*** • .L 
Understand 4.8 4.3 4.6 3.9 3.3** 2.6 
E -F-FOI~t -fLll 2.5 4.5 4.1 4.4 15.2*** .7 
Obstacles ,.., ~ L.,:) 4.5 3.5 3.8 15.4*** 5.3*** 
Sel-f resp. 3.1 2.7 2.5 ,.., ,.., L. L ,.., ,.., L. L 1.1 
Part. resp. 4.0 4.1 4.4 3.5 2.4 3.6* 
Se.1-F control 3.5 2.1 3.3 2.2 9.9*** 8.6*** 
Part. cont. 3.7 3.9 3.9 4.1 .6 ,.., • .L. 
Sel-f caLIse 4.5 3.2 3.4 3.4 5.9*** .3 
Part. caLIse 4.9 4.0 4.5 3.7 6.6*** 3 .. 4* 
E}~t • cause 3.2 4.0 3.9 4.4 3.1* 1.0 
Speci-fic 2.5 3.9 4.0 4.1 10.5*** '-" • .L. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Not~. The F- ratio is derived -From a One-way ANOVA across all -four 
emotions. The Fb ratio is derived -from the same analysis but across 
the three negative emotions only (hate, anger and jealousy). 
* g<.05 
** Q.<.Ol 
*** Q.<.OOl 
partner being rated as the cause o~ an emotion as well as being to 
blame ~or the eliciting event was highest ~or anger, and lowest on 
both dimensions ~or jealousy. 
Discriminant Function Analysi~ o~ 
Love, Hate, Anger and jealousy 
Appraisal Items ~or 
Initially, a discriminant ~unction analysis was per~ormed to 
assess predictability o~ membership in all ~our emotion categories 
~rom a combination o~ cognitive appraisal dimensions items. As 
expected, the ~irst discriminant ~unction separating love ~rom the 
negative emotions was highly signi~icant, (57, n = 160) = 316.54, 
2<.001. In order to elucidate the results with respect to the 
negative emotions, a further discriminant analysis was per~ormed to 
assess predictability o~ membership in the hate, anger and jealousy 
emotion categories ~rom a combination of appraisal dimension items 
(see Figure 1). Both discriminant functions (two being the maximum 
possible number given three target categories) were statistically 
signi~icant, with a combined li2 (38, n = 120) = 72.78, 2<.001. The 
~irst ~unction accounted ~or 61.3% of between groups variability, 
and discriminated between jealousy and hate/anger. With the ~irst 
~unction removed, li2 (18, n = 120) = 29.3, 2<.05. The second 
~unction accounted ~or 38.6% o~ the between groups variability and 
discriminated between hate and anger. Correlations o~ the 18 
predictor variables witn the discriminant ~unctions showed jealousy 
was positively related to low partner responsibility ~or the event 
(~ = .35), the partner not being the cause o~ the emotion (r = .31), 
and the event being hard to understand (r = .29); hate was 
positively related to the event's course being perceived as 
unpredictable (r = .58), with low self control (r = .56) and a high 
level o~ perceived obstacles (r = .54). 
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Fiqure 1. Plot o~ three group centroids on two discriminant 
~unctions derived ~rom cognitive appraisal variables in Study 1. 
pummary o-F Cognitive Appt-aisal Results 
These results allow us to add a cognitive dimension to the ~our 
emotion prototypes (see Table 5 -For a summary o-F emotibn prototype 
-features) • 
~ove. As e}:pected~ and in accord with Ells~"orth & Smith 
(1988b)~ love eliciting events were appraised as pleasant, 
important, and involving little e-f-Fort; subjects tended to credit 
their partners for the event. However, credit for the event was not 
rated in the same way as the perceived cause o~ this emotion~ -For 
which subjects rated themselves as highly as their partners. These 
causes were also rated as global~ suggesting that subjects believed 
there are non-situationally speci-fic qualities~ internal to both the 
subject and his or her partner, that cause -Feelings o-F love. Other 
important appraisal dimensions were the ease o-F understanding the 
eliciting event, its bene-Fit to the relationship, its typicality and 
predictability o-F course. Given the high proportion o-F subjects who 
felt calm and relaxed be-Fore the eliciting event, the results 
suggest that the typical love eliciting event ~or married subjects 
is neither very unexpected nor perhaps exciting. Even so~ the love 
-Felt is intense and pleasureable, con-Firming Berscheid's (1983) 
speCUlation that such love eliciting events are the "sta~~ o~ li~e 
~ot- many satis~ying long-term close relationships." (p. 156). 
Hate. Appraisals o-F hate eliciting events were the opposite to 
those -For love events, in that they were appraised as unpleasant, 
e-Ffortful and involving a high level of perceived obstacles; their 
course was unpredictable and subjects felt low levels of self 
control. Along with this, a very high proportion o-F subjects thought 
negatively about themselves during the incident, either believing 
they deserved such bad treatment, or blaming themselves -For putting 
up with the situation (as noted by Davitz, 1969). This does not mean 
that subjects necessarily blamed themselves ~or the eliciting event, 
however, since the mean sel~ blame rating on the appraisal 
dimensions was low. 
Anger. Appraisals o~ anger events dir~ered ~rom hate events on 
a number o~ dimensions, e. g. anger events were appraised as typical 
and easy to understand; their course was predictable, the partner 
was to blame, and the emotion itsel~ was very much partner caused. 
Perhaps the typicality and predictability aspects re~lect the 
~amiliarity people have with an anger script, or prototype, given 
that it is a very commonly experienced emotion both inside and 
outside close relationships (Averill, 1982). It is also interesting 
to note that while Ellsworth & Smith (1988a) ~ound appraisals o~ 
high perceived obstacles and other agency typi~ied anger, subjects 
in this study rated their appraisals on the perceived obstacle 
dimension as lower ~or anger than ~or hate Dr jealousy, although 
emotion intensity was comparable ror all three emotions. 
Jealousy. The key appraisals ~or jealousy appear to be related 
to the uncertainty and di~~iculty o~ understanding the situation, 
presumably because it is not typical (although Buunk & Bringle, 
1987, speculated that an atypical, situationally speci~ic event 
should reduce, rather than elicit, jealousy). The cause o~ jealousy 
is believed to be external (i. e. the third party), and 
situationally speci~ic, but the partner is perceived to have a good 
deal o~ control over the situation (as opposed to the selr). This 
idea was o~ten expressed in the protocols with remarks like "she was 
throwing hersel~ allover him, but he just sat there, lapping it 
up", and "thi s guy was comi ng on strong at wot-k, and she sai d she 
wasn't interested, but she still stayed late at the o~~ice ror 
dt~inks on Friday night." 
Discussion 
The results of the emotion prototype and cognitive appraisal 
analyses show that four distinctive profiles can be assembled, 
representing some basic, or prototypical, knowledge structures about 
love, hate, anger and jealousy. In particular, differences in 
cognitive appraisal patterns between the three negative emotions 
were striking, and suggest that even closely related emotions can be 
teased apart on the basis of such knowledge structures. 
With respect to prototypical features, the findings for anger 
were in general accord with the results of previous research Ce. g. 
Averill, 1982; Scherer et al., 1986; Shaver et al., 1987), 
particularly with respect to typical duration and physiological 
symptoms. Similarly with love, for which the prototype profile 
coincides closely with the results of Shaver et al. (1987) and Fehr 
(1988). However, studying these emotions, along with hate and 
jealousy~ from within a marital context alloWS a more detailed 
understanding of their nature and course than hitherto provided. 
For example, on the basis of these findings it is possible to 
predict that lettings one~s partner down, bullying or humiliating 
them, is more likely to elicit hate than anger; that it is possible 
to feel an emotion of love for your partner simply by thinking about 
their virtues when you1are in a peaceful mood; and that having your 
partner merely pay attention to a member of the opposite sex is a 
potent elicitor of jealousy, no matter how blameless your partner's 
attentions. Similarly, it is possible to predict that hate is more 
likely to be elicited than anger when a person is feeling depressed 
(perhaps contributing to the perception of low control), and that a 
person feeling hate for their partner also tends to think badly of 
57 
themselves. To summarize, this research has provided a clearer and 
more elaborate picture o~ the kinds o~ events that precipitate these 
emotions within close relationships: how they ~eel, what kinds o~ 
cognitions tend to accompany them, how they are usually expressed, 
and why, and what their perceived consequences are. The extent to 
which the ~indings o~ the present study can be applied to other 
relationship settings (e. g. between parent and child) or 
generalized to wider contexts (e. g. the study o~ racial hate) 
remains to be determined. However, the present research suggests 
that while emotion prototypes share some basic ~eatures across 
settings, they also display some interesting and theoretically 
important di~~erences in detail. 
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Study 2 
The emotion accounts in Study 1 were based on real, recalled 
incidents in married people's relationships. However, i~ prototype 
theory is correct, then our subjects would have drawn upon their 
emotion prototype knowledge in order to store and recall their 
emotion experiences. Presumably, then~ the same knowledge structures 
would be accessed when imagining a prototypical emotion incident in 
the li~e o~ a hypothetical married couple. If this is the case, then 
the prototype ~eatures obtained ~rom both kinds o~ account should be 
similar, even taking into account the larger number of detailed and 
idiosyncratic details likely to be present in the recalled accounts. 
I tested this hypothesis in Study 2 by having another group o~ 
married subjects write hypothetical accounts o~ stereotypical love, 
hate, anger and jealousy incidents in marriage, and comparing the 
prototypes with those obtained ~rom the ~irst study. However~ since 
subjects were to be required to imagine a typical event, rather than 
a real incident ~rom their own relationship, it was not practical to 
investigate detailed apprai5al patterns in this study. Similarly, 
several categories from Study 1 such as prior mood, and reasons for 
controlling the emotion, were omitted, because it was thought their 
inclusion might unduly encourage subjects to ~ocus on an actual 
event ~rom their own relationship. 
Another rationale.~or this study was to assess the extent to 
which the results ~rom Study 1 may have been in~luenced by social 
desirability ~actors. Emotions like anger, hate and jealousy tend to 
be disapproved o~ in Western society and considered destructive 
(Sommers, 1984). Accordingly, discussing their memories o~ these 
emotions may have been an uncom~ortable experience ~or some o~ our 
SUbjects. For example, despite McKellar's (1950) ~inding that the 
majority o~ hostile subjects want to take revenge and hurt the hated 
party~ only 27.5% o~ our subejcts claimed to have wanted either o~ 
these things, and only 2.5% responded by physically hurting their 
partners. Perhaps within close relationships, hate is experienced 
somewhat di~~erently to the predominantly bullying episodes recalled 
by McKellar's subjects, or it may be that subjects simply did not 
want to admit th~y had eKperient§d ~u~h urge~~ gr beh~yed in §y~h ~ 
way. Thus~ the second aim in obtaining typical accounts o~ the 
~eatures o~ love, hate, anger and jealousy episodes in marriage was 
to compare the two kinds o~ accounts ~or di~~erences and 
similarities~ speci~ically with respect to urges and behaviours. 
Method 
Subjects 
Eighty married subjects participated in this study, 40 men and 
40 women. The mean age o~ the sample was 39 yeat-s (sd = 9.9) and the 
mean relationship length was 13 years <sd = 9.1 years); a similar 
pro~ile to that ~or Study 1. Forty o~ the respondents completed 
their questionnaires in the laboratory~ and took another 
questionnaire home ~or their partner to complete. This questionnaire 
was completed at ~ome in private and posted back to the University 
in a stamped~ sel~ addressed envelope. The return rate ~or these 
questionnaires was good (77%). The ~inal sample comprised 34 
University students, with the remainder recruited ~rom the wider 
community through ~riends and relations. Di~~erences in age and 
account length between the two kinds o~ sample (laboratory and 
postal) were not signi~icant. 
Procedure and Measures 
Subjects were given a brie~ overview o~ the tasks they were to 
complete~ and an assurance about the con~identiality o~ their data. 
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Forty subjects were given a questionnaire which asked them to ~orget 
about their own relationship specirically, and to simply give their 
opinion about the whys and where~ores, within the context o~ a 
marital relationship~ of three common emotions: love, hate and 
jealousy. However, because I decided to obtain hypothetical anger 
accounts a~ter the experiment was nearly ~inished, the remaining 40 
subjects gave their opinion about the experience o~ anger only. 
Thus, as with Study 1, there wer. 40 hypothetical accounts ~or each 
emotion. 
Hypothetical Emotion Questionnaire (Appendix 5). The format of 
this questionnaire remained the same ~or all ~our emotions. Subjects 
were instructed to w~ite about the most typical kind of incident 
they believed would make one partner ~eel love (not lust), hate, 
, 
anger or jealousy toward the other in a marital relationship. A 
series of open-ended questions followed, inquiring about probable 
physiological symptoms, urges, cognitions, likelihood of emotional 
expression, and how the emotion would probably be expressed. 
Coding 
Two coders independently coded the 80 transcripts, using the 
Coding Scheme des~ribed in Study 1. As with Study 1, a high level of 
interrater reliability was achieved, ranging ~rom 92% (~or event 
category) to 100% (~or other emotions mentioned). 
Results 
The purpose o~ this study was to obtain a number of 
hypothetical emotion accounts ~or love, hate, anger and jealousy 
~rom people involved in marital relationships, and to compare these 
accounts with the results from the ~irst study. The second column of 
Table 5 shows the percentage of responses ~or the major question 
categories for the ~our emotions. As with the results ~rom Study 1, 
6:1. 
Table 5 
Summary o-f Prototypical Emotion Features -for Recalled and 
!:::!YILot het ical Accounts 
Proportion o-f Subjects 
Emotion Feature Recalled 
(.0. = 40> 
Love 
Recent (~"ithin 1 month) 72.5 
Elicited by: Thinking about p. 40 
P. gives time etc. 22.5 
Share happy times 22.5 
Feel: Calm, peace-ful 52.5 
Ut-ge: To be close 62.5 
To say "I love you" 20 
Butter-flies in stomach 25 
Feeling o-f inner warmth 20 
Rela>-:ed muscles 20 
Positive cognitions, sel-f 50 
Positive cognitions, pat-tnet- 100 
Behaviour: Say "I love you" 62.5 
Say nothing 27.5 
Hug, kiss partner 67.5 
Give presents 25 
Partner reaction: Loving 92.5 
Attempt to control -feelings 12.5 
Hate 
Elicited by: Badly treated 50 
Betrayed, lied to 2.5 
In-fidelity 5 
Humiliation 15 
Feel: Depr.essed 27.5 
Urge: To leave situation 40 
To hurt partner 12.5 
To take revenge 15 
To say "I hate you" 25 
Tight stomach 30 
Tense muscles 50 
Negative cognitions, sel-f 72.5 
Negative cognitions, partner 100 
Behaviour: Say "I hate you" 35 
Say nothing 47.5 
Act coldly, withdraw 37.5 
Behave as usual 27.5 
Hurt partner 2.5 
Yell, throw things 25 
Partner reaetion: Angry 32.5 
Hurt 22.5 
Attempt to contt-ol -feelings 75 
Hypothetical 
(.0. = 40) 
1(1 
67.5 
20 
25 
92.5 
15 
12.5 
32.5 
27. 
32.5· 
80 
62.5 
37.5 
87.5 
10 
5 
30 
27.5 
17.5 
7.5 
42.5 
55 
40 
15 
50 
50 
20 
80 
55 
40 
40 
10 
42.5 
20 
40 
DiFference 
-30 
-45* 
-02.5 
27.5 
-30 
5 
12.5 
-12.5 
-07.5 
17.5 
20 
-10 
-20 
15 
7.5 
-20 
-25 
-12.5 
7.5 
-02.5 
-42.5* 
-25 
10 
-20 
52.5* 
20 
-20 
-07.5 
-02.5 
17.5 
-40.5* 
05 
-35* 
Table 4 continued 
Anger 
Recent (within 1 month) 
Elicited by: Unfair treatment 
Badly treated 
Feel: Hurt 
Frustrated 
To yell~ shout 
To take revenge 
To hurt pat-tnet-
Tense muscles 
Hot and bothet-ed 
Tight stomach 
Negative cognitions, self 
Negative cognitions, partner 
Behaviour: Yell, shout 
Say nothing 
Stamp, throw things 
Act cold, withdraw 
Behave as usual 
Partner reaction: Angry 
Sorry 
Attempt to control feelings 
Jealousy 
Elicited by: Attn. to opp. se>: 
Infidelity 
Feel: Hurt 
An>:ious 
Urge: To e>:plain feelings 
To take t-evenge 
To hurt pclt"tner 
To leave situation 
To hurt third party 
Feel sick 
Tense muscles 
Agitated, restless 
Negative cognitions, self 
Negative cognitions, pat-tner 
Negative cognitions, 3rd party 
Behaviour: E}:press feelings 
Calm discussion 
Say nothi ng 
Act cold, withdraw 
Won-y, brood 
Yell, throw things 
Behave as usual 
Partner reaction: Loving, happy 
Surpt- i sed 
Attempt to control feelings: 
67.5 
47.5 
27.5 
12.5 
7.5 
57.5 
2.5 
7.5 
70 
30 
32.5 
100 
47.5 
22.5 
45 
12.5 
22.5 
35 
15 
72.5 
55 
12.5 
22.5 
20 
30 
12.5 
'") l:;" L..J 
12.5 
17.5 
47.5 
47.5 
22.5 
100 
100 
60 
.,..,"''"') I::" .L.L.~ 
27.5 
40 
35 
22.5 
17.5 
17.5 
52.5 
17.5 
77.5 
60 
10 
10 
15 
62.5 
27.5 
17.5 
6'-' c-L • ..J 
30 
32.5 
12.5 
80 
62.5 
30 
57.5 
22.5 
25 
55 
15 
15 
10 
35 
32.5 
22.5 
20 
20 
37.5 
67.5 
65 
80 
35 
47.5 
15 
32.5 
45 
2.5 
20 
12.5 
30 
-12.5 
-17.5 
02.5 
-07.5 
-05 
-25 
-10 
07.5 
-07.5 
-02.5 
20 
20 
-15 
-07.5 
-12.5 
-10 
47.5* 
-02.5 
7.5 
10 
-05 
-20 
-20 
-07.5 
-02.5 
10 
-20 
35 
20 
25 
-25 
12.5 
07.5 
-10 
20 
-02.5 
05 
47.5* 
-------------~--------------------------------------------------------
Note> Chi square tests were calculated across the two groups whose 
cell means were both >0 and expected cell frequencies were >5. 
Significant Chi squares at the 2 < .001 level are marked with an 
asterisk. 
it should be noted that not every subject answered every question, 
and many subjects gave multiple answers that ~ell into two or more 
categories. 
Comparison Between Recall and Hypothetical Accounts 
Love. In the main, t-ecall and hypothetical accounts o~ love 
were more similar than dissimilar. Nearly the same proportions o~ 
subjects reported that sharing happy times would elicit love, that 
subjects would have an urge to tell their partners they love them 
and would act on the urge, that subjects would not try to control 
their ~eelings, and would ~eel warm and relaxed. However, as 
expected, recall accounts comprised some idiosyncratic ~eatures, e. 
g. very ~ew hypothetical accounts included Uthinking about the 
partneru as a love eliciting event; rather, they more o~ten included 
one partner ~eeling love when the other was attentive or supportive 
in some way. Similarly, although most hypothetical accounts stated 
the loving person would both have an urge to hug and kiss the 
partner, and would actually do so, many recall subjects were either 
constrained ~rom doing this, or chose to give something to their 
partner instead. 
Hate. The two kinds o~ hate accounts shared a number o~ 
~eatures, in particular the urge to leave the situation, the cold 
behaviour, and the physiological symptoms. However, there were a 
number o~ dissimilarities, including type of eliciting event (with 
more hypothetical accounts mentioning in~idelity and betrayal than 
recall accounts), urges to take revenge or physically hurt the 
partner and actually doing so (very common in the hypothetical 
accounts), and trying to control the expression o~ the emotion (75% 
o~ the recall accounts described control strategies, compared with 
only 40% o~ the recall accounts). 
Anger. For both hypothetical and recall accounts, anger in 
marriage was most o~ten ~licited by one partner treating the other 
one unfairly. Symptoms included a tight stomach, feelings of being 
hot and bothered, tension, and yelling at the partner. However, as 
with hate, hypothetical accounts included an urge to physically hurt 
the partner or take revenge more o~ten than recall accounts, 
although very ~ew hypothetical accounts stated this would actually 
happen. 
J"ealousy. Similarities between the recall and hypothetical 
accounts o~ jealousy were striking, and included type o~ eliciting 
~v~nt (one p~rtn~r p~ytng ~ttentign to m m~mbgr gf the gpPQ~jte 
sex), urges to express ~eelings and hurt the third party, ~eeling 
sick, saying nothing, acting coldly and behaving as usual. However, 
hypothetical accounts contained no positive cognitions and ~ewer 
negative sel~ cognitions than recall accounts, were more likely to 
mention the urge ~or revenge or to physically hurt the partner 
(although not as much as in the hate accounts), and were more likely 
to mention that jealous spouses would express their ~eelings to 
their partners than recall subjects. 
Discussion 
In general, there were ~ew major di~~erences between the recall 
and the hypothetical accounts, and it seems possible that some o~ 
the di~~erences obtained may be related to subjects' wishes to 
present themselves ~avourably in the recall condition o~ Study 1. 
For example, the higher frequency of physically violent urges and 
behaviours ~or the three negative emotions in the hypothetical 
accounts, compared to the recall accounts, may be a ~unction o~ 
subJects7 unwillingness to report such urges and behaviours in Study 
1. 
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Another explanation ~or the di~~erences in the two accounts is 
related to the privileged access one has to one's own desires~ 
thoughts and intentions (Schwartz & Shaver~ 1987). For example~ the 
recall accounts, compared to the hypothetical accounts~ included 
thinking about the partner as a potent elicitor o~ love, and 
comprised a greater diversity o~ cognitions ~or hate and jealousy. 
In addition, e~~orts to control the negative emotions were much more 
prevalent in the recall than in the hypothetical accounts. Such 
sel~-control e~~orts are probably invisible to an observer. 
Perhaps also sel~-control strategies (which tended to be 
cognitive in nature) ,involve ignoring or re-interpreting de§tructive 
urges ~or the sake o~ maintaining harmony in the relationship. Thus, 
rather than being a ~unction o~ social desirability ~actors, it may 
be that the lower ~requency o~ violent urges and behaviours in the 
recall accounts, compared to the hypothetical accounts, constituted, 
in part, a ~aith~ul representation o~ actual incidents. Accordingly, 
the hypothetical account subjects may have been drawing on emotion 
knowledge structures o~ typical hate, anger and jealousy incidents, 
without taking into account the e~~orts o~ spouses to ameliorate the 
destructiveness o~ the situation. 
In general, however, the number o~ broad similarities obtained 
between the two studies supports the view that the prototypical 
~eatures o~ the ~our emotions represent stored emotion knowledge 
structures. 
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Study 3 
The major ~ocus o~ Study 3 concerned the in~luence o~ causal 
locus on the sel~-attribution o~ emotion. The reason ~or ~urther 
investigating this issue relates to the coding o~ emotion-eliciting 
events in Study 1. Examining the event categories in Table 2, it is 
apparent that in many cases, the ~our emotions typically ~eature 
aith~r th~ aelf, the p~rtner~ Dr §Dme Rxtern~l (third p~rty) 
circumstance as the major eliciting ~actor. For example, love was 
most typically elicited by the sel~ thinking about the partner, 
whereas hate and anger were almost always elicited by a partner-
caused event (e. g. being treated badly, or un~airly, by them). 
Jealousy events were typically elicited by an external or third-
party cause (e. g. the partner paying attention to a member o~ the 
opposite sex). 
Theoretically, this ~inding was not entirely unexpected, given 
the important role o~ causal locus in attributional accounts o~ 
emotion (e. g. Weiner, 1985). Weiner proposes that ~ollowing an 
initial appraisal o~ an event as positive or negative, people 
undertake a causal .search to determine the cause o~ the event and to 
assign responsibility ~or it. The result o~ this causal search 
is supposed to determine the speci~ic emotional reaction. For 
example, i~ an individual attributes the cause o~ their partner's 
critical remark to something internal to the partner rather than to 
themselves (i. e. the remark was undeserved), then anger is likely 
to be sel~-attributed. 
The importance o~ causal or responsibility locus on emotion 
labelling was con~irmed by ~our exploratory ~actor analyses which 
were conducted on the cognitive appraisal results ~or each emotion 
~rom Study 1.2 The results o~ these ~actor analyses must be regarded 
6
' 
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as purely provisional and suggestive, because o~ the low sample size 
in each analysis (n = 40). Nonetheless, in accord with the ~indings 
noted previously ~or the emotion-eliciting events, important causal or 
responsibility locus ~actors, among other ~actors, were obtained ~or 
each emotion: speci~ically, a sel~-cause appraisal ~actor was 
obtained ~or love, a partner-cause/blame ~actor was obtained for 
hate and anger, and an external-cause ~actor was obtained ~or 
jealousy. (For a summary o~ these results, see Appendix 6). 
One possible interpretation o~ these results is that the 
perceived causal locus o~ an emotion-eliciting event may be more 
important than the actual event (aside ~rom its valence) in 
determining emotion outcomes. Hence, the di~~erences obtained in 
Study 1 among the cognitive appraisal patterns ~or the ~our 
emotions might be more a ~unction o~ perceived causal locus, 
than a function of the emotions themselves. 
To investigate this issue, subjects involved in close 
relationships completed a questionnaire which required them to 
imagine a particular kind o~ emotion-eliciting event occurring in 
their own relationships. Subjects were told to imagine ~eeling 
either love, hate, anger or jealousy toward their partner, and that 
the cause o~ the emotion was either something to do with themselves, 
their partner, or an external ~actor. Subjects then completed the 
same list of cognitive appraisal dimension measures that was used in 
Study 1. The main purpose o~ this exercise was to test whether the 
perceived causal locus o~ the emotion would lead to signi~icantly 
di~~erent cognitive appraisal patterns within the ~our emotions. 
A second aim o~ this study was to assess whether the cognitive 
appraisal results ~rom Study 1 would be replicated with the more 
pallid, hypothetical-event approach used in this study. 
!'let hod 
Suqject§ 
Two hundred and sixteen Psychology students, currently involved 
in a close relationship, completed a 15 minute questionnaire during 
their laboratory class time. The mean age o~ the sample was 21.17 
years (ag = 5.9). 
Procedure (see Appendix 7). 
Subjects were instructed to imagine that they were experiencing 
either love, hate, anger or jealousy toward their partner in their 
own relationships. They were told that the reason they were ~eeling 
the emotion, or the cause o~ it, was something to do either with 
themselves, their partner, or something external (12 'conditions, 18 
subjects in each group). A couple o~ examples were provided ~or each 
condition, e. g. "Your partner may be ~lirting openly with one o~ 
your ~riends" (Jealousy, Pat-tner cause), or "You believe your 
partner~s ~amily is taking up too much o~ his or her time" (Anger, 
External cause). Subjects then wrote about the kind o~ event they 
had imagined, in order to enhance their concentration on the task. 
Finally, subjects answered 14 6 pt. Likert appraisal scales. 
These related to a) the imagined pleasantness o~ the event~ b) its 
importance to the relationship, c) subjects· certainty o~ 
understanding the event, d) the amount o~ e~~ort required to deal 
with the event~ e) th~ level of perceived obstacles associated with 
the event, ~) the event's expectedness, g) the event~s typicality, 
h) the predictability o~ the event's course, i) the amount o~ 
perceived control in the situation (sel~ and partner), j) the 
perceived cause o~ the emotion (a manipulation check: partner, self 
or external ~actors), and k) the speci~icity o~ the cause. Subjects 
also rated the intensity o~ the emotion. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Table 6 shows the mean appraisal scores ~or external, partner 
and sel~-caused emotion ratings over the 12 conditions. The results 
o~ a series o~ Oneway ANOVAs showed that ~or each o~ the ~our 
emotions~ mean external, partner and sel~-cause appraisal ratings 
were signi~icantly higher in the matching experimental condition 
than in the other two conditions (all > 10.2). These results 
show that subjects were ~ollowing the instructions closely. 
Discriminant Function Analyses ~or Hate, Anger and Jealousy 
The ~irst aim was to test whether the cognitive appraisal 
patterns ~or each emotion were substantially altered by the 
manipulation o~ causal locus. To accomplish this, ~our discriminant 
function analyses were performed separately ~or love, hate, anger 
and jealousy, to assess whether different cognitive appraisal 
patterns were associated with the three causal categories (self, 
partner and external locus). The three causal locus items, used as 
manipulation checks, were deleted from each analysis. Non-
significant discriminant functions were obtained for love~ anger and 
jealousy, indicating that the appraisal patterns ~or these emotions 
do not dif~er according to the causal locus o~ the emotion. However, 
one significant discriminant function was obtained ~or hate, ~2 (24, 
n = 54) = 40.8, 2<.01. This ~unction accounted ~or 64.5% of the 
between groups variability, and discriminated between partner-caused 
hate, and sel~/externally-caused hate. Correlations of the 12 
predictor variables with the discriminant function showed that the 
best discriminators between partner-caused hate and sel~/externally­
caused hate were greater intensity (L = .59) and partner control (L 
= .35) ~or partner-caused hate. 
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Table 6 
Mean Appraisal Ratings for External, Partner and Sel-f-Caus~ Across 
the 1~ Emotion Conditions 
Emotion 
Condition 
Love, e>:ternal 
Love pat-t net-
Love~ sel-f 
Hate, e}~ternal 
Hate, partner 
Hate, sel-f 
Anger, e>~ternal 
Anget- , partner 
Anger~ sel-f 
Jealousy, extet-nal 
Jealousy, partnet-
Jealousy, sel-f 
E:~tet-nal 
cause rating 
5.0 
2.5 
2.8 
5.2 
2.9 
3.0 
2.8 
3.0 
2.7 
2.5 
Partner 
cause rating 
3.3 
4.8 
3.6 
3.1 
5.4 
2. ~5 
3.0 
5.3 
,.., ~) 
L. • .L 
3. () 
5.0 
2.0 
Sel-f 
cause rating 
3.4 
2.5 
4.8 
3.3 
2.5 
5.1 
3.0 
1.9 
5.3 
2.7 
2.6 
'7 :1. 
Disct-iminant Function Analyses -for ~ate. Anger and Jealousy 
As causal locus, by and large, did not covary with the 
appraisal dimensions, the causal locus groups were collapsed. These 
data were then examined to determine i-f they replicated the 
cognitive appraisal results o-f Study 1. A discriminant -function 
analysis was conducted on all -four emotions, including love. As 
expected, and in accord with the results o-f Study 1, the -first 
discriminant -function separating love from the negative emotions was 
highly signi-ficant, li2 (45, n = 216) = 346.5, g<.OOI. 
A second discriminant -function analysis was per-formed to assess 
predictability o-f membership in the three negative emotion 
categories (omitting love) -from a combination o-f the appraisal 
dimension items. The -first discriminant -function was statistically 
signi-ficant, li2 (30, n = 162) = 50.4, g<.OI, and accounted -for 
75.12% o-f between-groups variability. As in Study 1, this -function 
discriminated between hate and jealousy/anger. The second 
discriminant -function was not signi-ficant. However, the overall 
pattern of results was similar to Study 1 (see Figure 2). 
Generally replicating the -first study, correlations o-f the 15 
predictor variables with the -first discriminant -function showed hate 
was associated with low intensity (r = .50), a high level o-f 
perceived obstacles (r = .25), relationship importance (r = .22), 
I 
and a situationally-speci-fic cause (r = .22). 
Discussion 
The results o-f this study demonstrate that dif-ferences in the 
perceived causes -for love, anger and jealousy, did not produce 
signi-ficantly di-f-ferent cognitive appraisal patterns within the 
three emotions. Interestingly, however, hate di-f-fered -from the other 
three emotions, in that partner-caused hate was discriminated -from 
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Figure ~. Plot o~ three group centroids on two discriminant 
~unctions derived ~rom cognitive appraisal variables in Study 3. 
externally and sel~-caused hate, on the basis o~ a di~~erent 
cognitive appraisal pattern. Even so, the results were easily 
interpretable~ in that partner-caused hate was simply rated as more 
intense and partner-controlled than sel~ Dr externally-caused hate. 
These results indicate that although perceived causal locus is 
an important element in the elicitation o~ emotions like love~ hate~ 
anger and jealousy~ locus alone is not responsible ~or the 
di~~erences in cognitive appraisal patterns across emotions. Rather, 
the di~~erences obtained appeared to be a ~unction o~ sets o~ 
appraisal patterns, other than locus. This suggests that Weiner~s 
(i985) causal attribution model o~ emotion might acquire more 
predictive and explanatory power, i~ it were incorporated within 
a more elaborate and thorough-going cognitive appraisal model. 
When the three causal categories ~or each emotion were 
combined, the cognitive appraisal patterns ~or hate, along with the 
patterns ~or love, anger and jealousy~ were similar to those 
obtained in the ~irst study~ although somewhat weaker. This is not 
surprising~ given the hypothetical nature o~ the task, and the ~act 
that causal locus; which is an important appraisal dimension~ was 
controlled ~or. Nonetheless~ the results provide converging evidence 
that the cognitive appraisal dimensions uncovered in Study 1 
represent stored know~edge structures about emotion eliciting events 
in the context o~ marriage. 
74 
study 4 
The ~inal study was concerned with ~urther testing the validity 
o~ the results in Study 1. The premise was that i~ the results o~ 
Study 1 were valid~ and represented the layperson's knowledge 
structures or scripts o~ love, hate, anger and jealousy in close 
relationships, then it should be possible ~or an ordinary person, 
whether in a close relationship or not~ to accurately select an 
emotion on the basis of the prototypical and cognitive appraisal 
in~ormation obtained in Study 1. 
The methodology involved ~lipping the procedure o~ Study 1 by 
as~essing whether subjects could correctly identi~y an emotion based 
on the relevant prototype and/or appraisal in~ormation. I selected 
two events representative o~ each emotion ~rom the ~irst study~ and 
presented them to groups o~ subjects either simply a) as events, b) 
as events with relevant prototypical ~eatures, c) as events with 
relevant cognitive appraisal dimensions~ or d) as events with 
relevant prototype and cognitive appraisal information. All four 
groups had to select the correct emotion ~rom a list o~ ~our 
positive (liking/love, happiness, pride and relie~), and ~our 
negative (dislike/hate, anger, jealousy, worry) emotions. 
By setting up the study in this way, it was also possible to 
assess the relative importance o~ cognitive appraisal versus 
prototype information in identi~ying emotions. In particular, I was 
interested to see i~ hate would be reliably discriminated ~rom 
anger, and love ~rom happiness (and on the basis o~ what kind of 
information), given that the status o~ love and hate as discrete 
emotions is by no means clear (Frijda, 1986; Kemper, 1987). 
It was predicted that subjects would achieve the lowest 
identi~ication rates when presented with an event alone, and the 
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highest rates when presented with an event plus all the relevant 
inTormation. A Tinal, exploratory issue concerned whether some 
emotions would be more readily identiTied than others, irrespective 
oT the kind oT inTormation provided. No predictions were advanced 
concerning this question. 
Method 
§ubjects 
One hundred students Tram the University OT Canterbury (54 
males and 46 Temales> were recruited Tor this study. 
Procedure 
Subjects were told the purpose OT the study was ~o discover how 
well people could predict other people's emotions. Subjects read 8 
short~ descriptive passages, and chose Trom a list oT 8 emotions the 
particular emotion they thought the character in the story was most 
probably Teeling. 
Measures 
There were Tour kinds oT questionnaire distributed (Tor Tour 
groups oT 25 subjects), each containing 8 descriptive passages 
accompanied by the same list oT 8 emotions: dislike/hate, anger, 
jealousy, worry, liking/love, happiness, pride and relieT. Pride, 
happiness, relieT and worry Tunctioned as Tiller emotions. Thus, 
each target emotion (l~ve, hate, anger and jealousy) was represented 
by two events Tor each subject in each experimental condition. The 8 
events were the same across all questionnaires, but the amount OT 
accompanying inTormation diTTered depending on the experimental 
condition. The events were derived Trom the prototypical emotion 
eliciting events described in Study 1 Tor each oT the Tour emotions, 
but expressed in a relatively ambiguous Torm. 
Condi t ion 1. - Event Descl~ ipt ion Only 
Hate events: 
/6 
a) Kate and Richard are out together shopping. Kate tries 
on a pair o~ shorts and Richard passes a remark about 
her appearance. What is Kate +eelin9? 
b) Bob ~nd LQuise are hosting a ~inner party~ While he 15 
in the kitchen, Bob overhears Louise giving her opinion 
o~ his cooking to the guests. What is Bob ~eeling? 
Jealousy events: 
a) Ken con~ides to Marie that a woman has been pestering 
him at work and insisting on telling him her problems. 
What is Marie ~eeling? 
b) Rob does not enjoy squash, so Wendy decides to play 
with a work colleague. What is Rob ~eeling? 
Love events: 
a) Patricia and Derek are on holiday together. Patricia 
goes way over budget when she buys Derek an expensive 
piece o~ pottery. 'What is Derek +eeling? 
b) Catherine 'and Phillip were not planning to start a 
~amily ~or a ~ew more years. However, Catherine 
in~orms Phillip one evening that she is pregnant. 
Phillip reacts positively. What is Catherine ~eeling? 
Anger events: 
a) Colin has been aw~y at a con~erence all week. When 
he comes back, he ~inds Jill has had the lounge 
pro+essionally redecorated. What is Colin ~eeling? 
b) Moira and Doug are going through the bills together. 
Doug remarks on their current state 0+ +inances. 
What is Moira ~eeling? 
Condition Z - Cognitive Appraisal 
"',·7 
/ f 
In this condition, event descriptions were combined with ~ive 
di~~erent appraisal dimensions, selected ~or each emotion on the 
basis o~ the results o~ Study 1. These dimensions were then 
elaborated into a story-like ~ormat. For love, the selected 
appraisal dimensions were "typical", "partner caused", "global", 
"understandable", and "predictable", e. g.: 
Patricia and Derek are on holiday together. Patricia 
goes way over budget when she buys Derek an expensive 
piece o~ pottery. Derek isn't at all surprised, ~or he 
believes it is typical o~ Patricia to do things like 
this. A~ter all, she is a very generous person. Derek 
~inds her behaviour easy to understand and predictable. 
For the two hate events, the relevant dimensions were 
"e>:pected", "percei ved obstac les", "e~~ort requi red", "unpredictable 
course" and "low sel-f control", e. g.: 
Kate and Richard are out together shopping. Kate tries on 
a pair 0+ shorts and Richard passes a remark about her 
appearance. Kate doesn"t ~ind Richard's remark very 
surprising, but it makes her even more aware o~ how 
di~~icult it is'to get the kind o~ caring she needs and 
wants ~rom Richard. Kate has to make a real e~~ort to 
deal with the situation. She ~eels she cannot predict 
what will happen next, and wishes she ~elt more in control. 
For the two anger events, the relevant dimensions were 
"unexpected", "predictable", "typical", "understandable" and 
"partner responsible", e. g.: 
Colin has been away at a con~erence all week. When he 
comes back, he ~inds Jill has had the lounge 
pro~essionally redecorated. Although Jill's behaviour 
initially takes Colin by surprise, he knows what will 
happen when they discuss the matter a~ter all, they 
o~ten disagree about his skills as a "handyman". He 
understands why Jill has done it, but believes she is 
wrong to do something 50 drastic without consulting him 
~irst. He thinks the whole situation is entirely her ~ault. 
For the two jealousy events, the relevant dimensions were: "low 
pat-tnet- responsibility"~ "e>:tet-nally caused"~ "hat-d t'o understand", 
"high partner control", and "situationally speci~ic cause", e. g.: 
Ken con~ides to Marie that a woman has been pestering him 
at work and insisting on telling him her problems. Marie 
knows it's not Ken's ~ault that this woman is pestering 
him, but she finds it hard to understand why he chooses 
to spend time with her. It's not like Ken to act this way. 
Condition ~ - Symptoms, Urges a~g Behaviours 
In this condition, event descriptions were combined with 
in~ormation about the physiological symptoms, urges and behaviours 
o~ the character exper~encing the emotion. Two symptoms, one urge 
and two behaviours ~or each emotion were selected on the basis o~ 
the results in Study 1. These ~eatures were then elaborated into a 
story-like ~ormat. For the two love events, the selected symptoms 
wet-e "warmth" and "t-ela}:ed musc les", the urge was "to be physical 1 y 
close", and the behaviours were "expressing ~eelings verbally" and 
"being physically close", e. g.: 
Catherine and Phillip were not planning to start 
a ramily ror a rew more years. Catherine inrorms 
Phillip one evening that she is pregnant. Phillip 
reacts positively_ Catherine reels warm and relaxed, 
and has an urge to be physically close to Phillip_ She 
tells him how she reels and gives him a hug. 
For the two hate events, the selected symptoms were "muscle 
tension" and "tight stomach", the urge was "to leave the situation", 
and the behaviours were "act coldly, withdraw emotionally" and 
"behave as usual", e. g.: 
Bob and Louise are hosting a dinner party. While 
he is in the kitchen, Bob overhears Louise giving 
her opinion or his cooking to their guests. Bob's 
muscles tense up and he reels a tight sensation in 
his stomach. He has an urge to just walk out On the 
whole situation. When their guests have gone, he tidies 
up as ir nothing is wrong, but acts coldly toward Louise 
and withdraws rrom her physically and emotionally. 
For the two anger events, the selected symptoms were "muscle 
tension" and "hot and bothet-ed", the urge was "to e}!press -feelings", 
and the behaviours wer'e "express vet-ball y and nonverbal I y", e. g.: 
Moira and Doug are going through the bills together. 
Doug remarks on the current state o-f their -finances. 
Moira's muscles tense up and she -feels hot and bothered. 
She has an urge to tell Doug what she thinks about his 
comment. She waves the bank statement in rront o-f Doug 
and yells at him." 
For the two jealousy events~ the selected symptoms were 
"-feeling sick" and "agitation"~ the urge ~"as "to express -feelings", 
and the two behaviours wet-e to "act coldly~ withdraw"~ and "brood 
about situation!!, e. g.: 
Rob does not enjoy squash, so Wendy decides to play 
with a work colleague. Rob is -feeling sick and agitated. 
He wants to tell Wendy how he ~eels about the situation, 
but spends most o-f his time brooding about it instead. 
When Wendy returns -from her ~irst game~ Rob acts coldly 
and withdraws -from her physically and emotionally. 
Condition i 811 
In this condition, event descriptions were presented along with 
all the appraisal, symptomatic, urge and behavioural in-formation 
included in the previous conditions. For example, one o-f the 
jealousy events read like this: 
Rob does not enjoy squash, so Wendy decides to play 
with a work colleague. Rob is feeling sick and agitated. 
He knows it·s not Wendy's -fault that she enjoys squash 
and he doesn~t, but he feels she could easily give the 
game up rather than play with someone else. He wants to 
tell Wendy how' he -feels about the situation, but spends 
most of his time brooding instead. He can't understand what 
is going on, it·s not like Wendy to act this way. When she 
returns -from her ~irst game, Rob acts coldly and withdraws 
physically and emotionally from her. 
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Results 
Em~~on Identi~ication Accuracy 
Figure 3 depicts the emotion identification accuracy rates for 
each emotion over all ~our experimental conditions. A 4 (in~ormation 
level) X 4 (emotion category) analysis of variance~ with repeated 
measUres on the second ~actor~ ~ound a signi~icant main effect ~or 
in~ormation condition, E (3,96) = 12.07, g<.OOl. As expected, the 
emotion accuracy rates improved in a linear ~ashion as more 
in~ormation was presented (event tl = 26.5/.; event plus prototype tl = 
51.5/.; event plus appraisal tl = 55.5/.; all in~ormation tl = 68.5/.). 
In addition~ there was a signi~icant main e~~ect ~or emotion 
category, E (3,288) = 13.59~ R<.OOI. As can be seen in Figure 3, 
jealousy was the most accurately identi~ied emotion overall (tl = 
64.5%), followed by anger (tl = 53%) and love (tl = 49.5%). Hate was 
the least accurately identified (tl = 34%). The interaction e~fect 
was not significant. 
A series o~ contrast analyses comparing accuracy rates to the 
base condition (event description only) was also carried out within 
each emotion target category. In the event plus appraisal condition, 
three emotions showed significant differences in accuracy over the 
event only condition: hate (tl = 44%, i (96) = 3.4, g<.OOI), anger (tl 
= 52%, i (96) = 2.2, g<, .02), and love (tl = 52%, i (96) = 3.8, 
R<.OOI. However, the di~ference in accuracy for jealousy ttl = 58%) 
was not signi~icant, reflecting its high baseline accuracy. 
In the event plus prototype condition, three emotions showed a 
signi~icant increase in accuracy over the event only condition; 
anger (tl = 58/.~ i (96) = 2.8, R < .05), love (tl = 60%, i (96) = 4.7, 
Q<.OOl), and jealousy (tl = 72%, i (96) = g<.Ol). As illustrated 
in Figure 3, the accuracy level for hate was much lower in the 
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prototype condition than in the appraisal condition, suggesting that 
~or this emotion, as opposed to the other three, appraisal 
in~ormation is more critical to its correct identi~ication than is 
information about 5ymptoms~ urges and behaviours. It should also be 
noted that this was the only emotion which showed a signi~icant 
di~~erence between mean emotion accuracy ~or event plus prototype 
and event plus appraisal in~ormation, i (96) = 2.6, g<.Ol. 
Emptions t10st O~ten Chosen Over Target Emotion~ 
Given the suggestion that love and happiness, along with hate 
and anger, are more or less indistinguishable, (Kemper, 1987; 
Ft-ijda, 1986) and that jealousy is a comple>: mb: o~ emotions like 
anger, fear and sorrow (Sharpsteen, in press), I was interested to 
see i~ subjects would in ~act be able to discriminate between these 
emotions on the basis o~ the prototype and/or cognitive appraisal 
in~ormation obtained in Study 1. The results are depicted in Figures 
4 - 7. 
Love .:target emotion. (Figure 4). As Figure 4 illustrates, 
subjects readily discriminated between love and happiness; indeed, 
the mean rate o~ happiness mentions never exceeded 28%, and was only 
14% in the all in~ormation condition. 
Hat~ .t_C\r:9.€i em,Qi;.iqn. (Figure 5). Subjects found it di fficul t to 
discriminate between h~te and anger in the hate target emotion 
prototype condition, where the mean rate of anger choices was 52%, 
and the mean rate o~ hate choices was 28%. The reverse occurred in 
the appraisal condition, however, where anger dropped to 38% and 
hate achieved 44%. In the all in~ormation condition anger ~ell to 
34%, while hate achieved 54%. These results clearly suggest that the 
symptoms, urge and behaviours selected ~rom Study 1 to represent 
hate may be equally representative o~ anger. 
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Anger .t.f-lrgei;. gmot ion. (Figure 6). The results -fOt" the anger 
target emotion condition (Figure 6)~ however, indicate an asymmetry 
in the hate-anger relationship. In both the prototype and cognitive 
appraisal conditions, anger was rarely con~used with hate (H = 8%), 
and in the all information condition~ hate was never selected. 
Indeed, the most frequently chosen alternative emotion -for anger was 
wort"y. 
(Figure 7). Like anger, jealousy was 
rarely confused with any other emotion besid~s worry. This is in 
accord with previous research that suggests worry, or anxiety, is a 
major component of je~lousy. 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment demonstrated that love, hate, 
anger and jealousy can, by and large, be identi-fied on the basis of 
the appraisal and/or emotion prototype in-formation gathered in Study 
1. The results also suggest that~ in the main~ emotion prototype 
information is equally as helpful as cognitive appraisal in-formation 
for accurate emotion identification. However, the addition o-f 
appraisal informat{on to the ambiguous jealousy event did not 
signi-ficantly increase identification accuracy, which was 
substantial to begin with. Clearly, some property inherent to any 
three-party, close relationship situation is particularly salient 
for the elicitation of this emotion label (as hypothesized by Hupka, 
1984). 
Hate was the least accurately identified emotion over every 
information condition. In particular, hate prototype information led 
the majority of subjects to incorrectly identify the target emotion 
as anger. However, there was an asymmetry in the hate-anger 
relationship, in that subjects did not confuse the prototypical 
89 
anger ~eatures with hate. 
One explanation o~ these results is that the prototypical hate 
~eatures obtained ~rom the recall accounts in Study 1 represent 
important elements o~ a more inclusive anger script, or prototype. 
This accords with Shaver et al"s (1987) assertion that emotion 
concepts are arranged hierarchically, with anger being a more basic 
emotion than hate. Consequently, prototypical ~eatures relevant to 
hate are subsumed within the broader anger category. A di~~erent 
explanation is suggested by the discrepancies between the urges and 
behaviors ~or hate in the recall (Study 1) and hypothetical (Study 
2) conditions. Recall accounts cited wanting to leave. the situation 
and acting coldly as criterial ~eatures, whereas the most popular 
~eatures in the hypothetical accounts were wanting to physically 
hurt the partner, verbally abusing and slapping or kicking them. As 
previously noted, one interpretation ~or this is that the recall 
subjects were loath to admit to such heinous activities, which 
suggests that the hypothetical accounts produced the more accurate 
hate prototype. This, in turn, implies that subjects ~rom Study 3 
may have more accurately discriminated between hate and anger, had 
they been presented with the violent urges and behaviours ~rom the 
hypothetical accounts, rather than the withdrawal behaviours ~rom 
the recall accounts. 
To test these speculations, I conducted a partial replication 
o~ Study 3 wuth 50 third year Psychology students. Only two 
in~ormation conditions were investigated~ prototype and all-
in~ormation, with the love, anger and jealousy scenarios being the 
same as ~or study 3. However, the hate scenarios were di~~erent, in 
that the urge to leave the situation was replaced by the urge to 
physically hurt the partner, and the withdrawal behaviours were 
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replaced by abusive behaviours (verbal and physical) toward the 
partner. 
As expected, the results ~or love, anger and jealousy 
replicated the ~indings o~ Study 3 very closely in both in~ormation 
conditions, although subjects were overall somewhat more accurate 
in the replication (Prototype in~ormation only: Love = 58%, Anger = 
58%, Jealousy = 76%; Prototype pluB appraisal in~Drmatjon: Love = 
78%~ Anger = 74%, Jealousy = 86%). However, the accuracy rate ~or 
hate was slightly worse in the revised prototype condition <22%) 
than in Study 3 (28%), and substantially worse in the all-
iri~ormation (prototype and appraisal) condition (341. as opposed to 
54% in Study 3). Subjects overwhelmingly selected anger, as opposed 
to hate, as the appropriate emotion. 
These results do not support the earlier argument that the 
prototypical ~eatures ~or hate derived ~rom the recall accounts were 
badly distorted by social desirability biases. Rather, they are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the urges and behaviours 
reported in both the recalled (withdrawal) and hypothetical 
(ablJsive) hate accounts ~orm part of an inclusive anger script. 
Moreover, although cognitive appraisal in~ormation substantially 
improved subjects· ability to correctly identify hate in the 
original study's all-i~~ormation condition, when appraisal 
in~ormation was combined with abusive urges and behaviours, the 
accuracy level was much lower. Perhaps this is because hitting and 
verbally a~Jsing one's partner implies a degree o~ power that is 
incompatible with a low situational control appraisal (relevant to 
hate), and the behaviours override the appraisal information. 
However, wanting to leave a situation, or acting coldly to one~s 
partner is quite compatible with this kind of low power appraisal, 
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leading to more accurate hate identi~ication. 
Overall, the results suggest the differences between hate and 
anger are subtle, and depend on the way individuals interpret 
situations, rather than on their urges and behaviours. '"he results 
also suggest that, rather than being inaccurate or idiosyncratic~ 
the prototypical hate ~eatures ~rom the recall accounts are 
reasonably accurate depictions o~ the script ~or this emotion within 
a marital setting. This +inding lends weight to McKellar's (1950) 
and Roseman's (1984) speculations that one ~eels hate when it is not 
e):pedient to express anger. In particular~ it is striking that most 
recall accounts ~or all three negative emotions reported e~forts to 
control emotional expression, in contrast to hypothetical accounts 
where such e~~orts were in~requently reported. Perhaps the 
hypothetical account subjects did not make allowances for the kinds 
o~ emotion-management strategies and accommodation processes couples 
employ to maintain harmony within their relationships (Rusbult, 
Verette, Whitney, Slovik & Lipkus, 1991). 
Given that emotion prototypes have ~uzzy boundaries, we would 
not expect per~ect accuracy in matching emotions to events, no 
matter how much information is provided. However, these results 
provide important support ~or the findings o~ the ~irst study, 
particularly with respect to the appraisal dimension distinctions 
between hate and anger. The fact that naive subjects could make use 
o~ this kind o~ abstract in~ormation to identi~y hate adds 
considerable weight to the cognitive appraisal approach to emotion. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The aims o~ these ~our studies were to investigate emotion 
knowledge structures, including prototypes and cognitive appraisals, 
~or love, hate, anger and jealousy within the context o~ marital 
relationships. The ~esults can be ~eadily summarized. 
In Study 1, married subjects recalled an incident o~ love, 
hate, anger or jealousy ~rom their own relationships and wrote 
accounts o~ their physiological symptoms, urges, behaviours and 
appraisals o~ the eliciting event. Four distinct prototype and 
cognitive appraisal patterns were obtained ~or each o~ the ~our 
emotions. 
In Study 2, subjects wrote hypothetical accounts describing 
typical love, hate, anger and jealousy incidents in marriage. In 
general, the results were in accord with Study 1, suggesting that 
both kinds o~ account were derived ~rom the same prototypical 
knowledge structures. However, there we~e some discrepancies 
between the accounts. For example, withdrawal urges and behaviours 
were commonly cited in recall hate accounts, whereas physically 
violent urges and behaviours were commonly cited in hypothetical 
accounts. 
study 3 investigated the extent to which the cognitive 
appraisal patterns obtained in Study 1 were a ~unction o~ the causal 
locus o~ the emotion, as against the emotion itsel~. Subjects 
• imagined love, hate, anger or jealousy eliciting events in marriage 
that had been caused either by themselves, thei~ partners or 
external ~actors. Subjects then rated their cognitive appraisals o~ 
the event and the emotion according to the same appraisal items that 
were used in Study 1. Although a signi~icant di~~erence in appraisal 
patterns was obtained between externally and sel~/partner caused 
hate, no signi~icant appraisal pattern di~~erences according to 
causal locus were ~ound ~or love, anger or jealousy. With the 
causal categories combined, the cognitive appraisal patterns ~or the 
four emotions were in general accord with those obtained in Study 1. 
In general, this study suggested that causal locus is an important 
appraisal category, but is not the sole determinant o~ emotion 
labelling. 
The purpose o~ the ~inal study was to ~urther validate the 
prototype and cognitive appraisal results obtained in Study 1. 
Subjects selected the most appropriate emotion ~rom a list o~ 8 
emotions, including liking/love, dislike/hate, anger and jealousy, 
for a interactive events presented with varying amounts of 
in~ormation (event only, event plus appraisals, event plus 
prototypes, and event plus all in~ormation> derived ~rom Study 1. In 
general, adding prototypical and/or cognitive appraisal information 
signi~icantly increased emotion identi~ication accuracy over the 
event-only description, with jealousy being the most accurately 
identi~ied~ and hate the least. A partial replication of Study 4 was 
conducted in order to test whether hate identi~ication accuracy 
would be improved if the prototypical featUres from the recall 
accounts (withdraWal) were replaced by the ~eatures from the 
hypothetical accounts (verbal and physical abuse>. In ~act, hate 
identi~ication accuracy was worse in the replication study, 
; 
suggesting that prototypical hate ~eatures ~rom the recall accounts 
were reasonably accurate depictions o~ the script ~or hate in 
marriage. 
In summary, the results of these ~our studies with respect to 
the elicitation, associated cognitive appraisal dimensions and 
prototypical features o~ love, hate, anger and jealousy, suggest 
that all ~our emotions represent meaning~ul emotion knowledge 
constructs to the married layperson. In the discussion to ~ollow, I 
will examine the role o~ context in the study o~ emotion knowledge 
structures~ and compare what has been learned ~rom these studies 
with the ~indings ~rom more typical~ context-~ree research. 
Directions ~or ~uture research using the combined prototype and 
cognitive appraisal approach will be outlined, along with a 
consideration o~ ecological validity problems. I will then discuss 
the importance o~ including emotion knowledge structures within more 
broadly-based, cognitive and behavioural models o~ close 
relationship processes. Finally, I will conclude with a brie~ 
co~mentary on the theoretical debate concerning the relationship 
between so-called basic emotions and emotion concepts. 
Emotion Prototype Analysis: The Role p~ Context 
An important theme in this series o~ studies was related to the 
role of context in the derivation of em6tion prototypes~ given that 
previous emotion prototype and cognitive appraisal research has 
almost invariably been conducted in a context-~ree ~ashion. Overall, 
the prototypes ~or love, hate, anger and jealousy, derived ~rom 
within marital settings, revealed a pattern o~ both similarities and 
dif~erences. In particular~ some intriguing ~eatures not usually 
obtained in the more typical, context-+ree investigations were 
obtained. For example, the results o~ Study 1 revealed some 
unexpected parallels between anger and love for married couples: 
both were experienced recently and involved an active engagement 
with the partner, and the eliciting events +or both emotions were 
appraised as having had predictable courses, along with being 
partner-caused, somewhat typical, and easy to understand. This 
suggests, in accord with the emotion ~requency results ~rom the 
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+irst part 0+ the study, that love and anger are +requently 
experienced emotions in married lire, and that the course 0+ both 
emotions tends to be well-rehearsed and minutely scripted. 
As might be expected on the basis 0+ previous prototype 
research (e. g. Shaver et al., 1987), the two most closely related 
negative emotions were hate and anger. However, despite the 
intriguing +inding in the +ourth study that the hate prototype was 
somewhat conTused with anger, whereas the anger prototype was not 
conTused with hate, the two emotions did reveal distinct 
prototypical and appraisal patterns in the +irst study. This 
suggests that behavioural a++ect coding schemes which do not include 
hate (e. g. Gottman ~ Levenson, 1986), may not capture the +ull 
range 0+ discrete and power+ul negative emotions that occur in 
marital contexts. In general, spouses experiencing hate believed 
they had been unsupported or badly treated at a deeper and more 
serious level than was indicated by +eeling anger, which more o+ten 
involved 5ituatiDn~ in which Dne partner felt they had been 
(undeservedly) treated in an inequitable manner. In particular, the 
perception 0+ low sel+-control and the high level 0+ perceived 
obstacles in the hate situations suggest that the partner with less 
power in a distressed relationship (perhaps involving physical or 
emotional abuse) is more likely to +eel hate than anger (as 
hypothesized by McKellar, 1950, and Roseman, 1984). Similarly, the 
results suggest that delivering blows to a partner's sel+ esteem 
when he or she is already Teeling vulnerable (e. g. depressed) can 
be a power+ul elicitor OT hate. 
Finally, the results indicate that jealousy can be as salient 
+or married couples as it is +or those in the +irst +lush 0+ 
romance. This +inding lends weight to Berscheid's (1983) warning 
'7Q 
that no marriage OF close relationship is immune to the potentially 
negative e~~ects o~ a third party intrusion. Similarly, the 
behavioural pro~iles associated with jealousy obtained in Studies 1 
and 2 (negative sel~ thoughts~ brooding~ acting coldly, pretending 
nothing is wrong), are in accord with Stearns" (1989) assertion that 
the current societal rule ~or handling jealousy appears to be guilt, 
circumvention and escape, rather than con~rontation. However, while 
Stearns believes that the desire to present a cool exterior when 
~eeling jealous tends to worsen marital tension~ the majority o~ 
subjects in Study 1 recalled that their episode o~ jealousy had a 
positive outcome. This result indicates that couples, in general, 
both understand and ~orgive each other's occasional insecurity and 
jealousy, despite the widespread belief that jealousy is a 
destructive, unacceptable emotion in close relationships (Sommers, 
1984) • 
Combining Cognitive Appraisal and Prototype Approaches in the Study 
of Emotion Knowledge 
In accord with previous prototype research (e. g. Shaver et 
al., 1987), the results o~ this research indicate that emotion 
concepts are script-like in nature~ initiated by a particular 
category of event~ and proceeding through a number o~ linked sub-
events (including urges, behaviours, physiological reactions, 
partner reactions, etc.). As Russell (1991) comments~ these 
subevents, described by the conceptls features, are ordered in a 
causal sequence~ similar to the way in Which actions are ordered in 
a playwright's script. 
Clearly, one step in this causal sequence relates to the 
individual's cognitive appraisal~ or interpretation o~ the eliciting 
event. Moreover, in accord with previous cognitive appraisal 
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research (e. g. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987), the results o~ this 
series o~ studies indicate that emotions are indeed elicited by (or, 
at least, associated with) discrete sets o~ appraisals. However, 
despite the integral part played by the cognitive appraisal process 
in emotion script knowledge, research to date has not integrated the 
cognitive appraisal and prototypical ~eatures o~ emotion into 
comprehensive emotion metascripts. 
One o~ the aims o~ this research was to demonstrate the 
potential strengths o~ a combined cognitive appraisal and prototype 
analysis ~or extending our knowledge of emotions in a variety of 
settings, but in particular, the close relationship context. 
Overall, this aim has been achieved, in that cognitive appraisal 
analysis led to the identification of the kinds of event categories 
and situational appraisals that dif~erentiate between hate, anger 
and jealousy in marriage, while prototype analysis provided a wealth 
of detail about accompanying moods, urges, behaviours, physiological 
symptoms, control strategies, and partner reactions. Clearly~ this 
combination o~ the two techniques enables researchers to construct 
comprehensive and complex accounts of emotion scripts, even when the 
emotion concepts in question appear to be closely related. 
However, an important further step will be to combine the 
prototype and cognitive appraisal approaches in order to make 
detailed observational and sel~-report analyses o~ emotion prototype 
~eatures (e. g. urges, symptoms, behaviours), and changing cognitive 
appraisal patterns, during marital interaction. This kind o~ 
research would not only validate the results o~ retrospective and 
hypothetical studies such as those reported here, but would also 
enable researchers to track the links between changes in cognitive 
appraisals, emotions and behaviours. This has important theoretical 
'itl 
implications, ror, as Roseman, Spindel and Jose (1990) have pointed 
out, cognitive appraisals during an-emotion eliciting event (such as 
a problem solving discussion), may be quite dirrerent to the 
appraisals anteceding the event. For example, one partner may rind 
the interaction unexpectedlY effcrtful p Dr the di~cu~~ign m~y ba 
brought to a surprisingly positive conclusion. These dirrerent 
app~aisal patterns should elicit di~~erent emotions during the 
course Or the event. Thus, analysis or changing cognitive appraisal 
patterns during a real time event has the capacity to elucidate our 
understanding or how emotions rluctuate and change, and in turn 
inrluence behaviour, in a dynamic, interactive r8shion. 
The Problem Or Ecological Validity 
Another important issue ror rurther research concerns which 
emotion concepts to study. As noted in the Introduction, the emotion 
labels or love, hate, anger and jealousy were selected ror 
investigation in this research programme on the basis OT their 
Yelevance in previous close relationship Yesearch (e. g. Fitness & 
Fletcher, 1990), and because research suggests they represent good 
examples or the concept or emotion to the laypeyson (e. g. Shaver et 
a 1., 1987). 
However, one problem with supplying emotion labels to subjects 
is that the same emotions of emotion labels may not occur 
spontaneOUSly in everyday interaction with any great rrequency. For 
example, it may be that, given the option, subjects would have 
indicated that arrection and irritation were the most ~requently 
experienced emotions in their marriages, as opposed to the possibly 
more intense and inclusive concepts o~ love and anger. Similarly, 
hate and jealousy are strong terms, implying intense emotions. As 
indicated by this group or subjects, such rull-blown emotions may be 
experienced relatively in~requently in the course o~ day-to-day 
married li~e. In terms o~ the validity o~ the prototype and 
cognitive appraisal data gathered here, there may not be important 
di~~erences between love and a~~ection, or anger and irritation, 
apart ~rom the obvious di~¥erence. in intensity. On the other hand, 
this is not a conclusion to be taken ~or granted; ~or example, 
Ellsworth & Smith (1988b) have ~ound subtle di~~erences in appraisal 
patterns between such closely related positive emotion concepts as 
hope/con~idence, tranquillity, challenge, interest, play~ulness and 
love. 
This point highlights the need ~or more descriptive, 
ecologically valid re~earch into emotions in marriage (see Epstein, 
1983, ~or a discussion on the ecological study o~ emotions in 
everyday li~e). Speci~ically, researchers need to discover which 
particular emotion concepts and scripts are the most relevant to 
married couples, and to construct detailed accounts o~ couples~ 
knowledge of the$e 5~ript5. In addition, res.ear~her~ s.hould 
investigate how emotion scripts change at di~~erent periods o~ 
married li~e; in particular, when couples are very happy or unhappy. 
Clarke (1987) has made a use~ul start in this area, by having 
married subjects think o~ the most typical kinds o~ emotional 
sequences and progressions that occur in marriage (e. g. ~rom 
romantic love to happiness, and then to boredom and contempt, etc.,) 
drawing on subjects~ own knowledge or their knowledge o~ other 
people~s marriages. Subjects were required to think o~ the sequences 
in terms o~ months and years, rather than minutes and hours, and to 
report emotion reciprocity patterns in strict partner alternation 
sequences. Each subject then built up ~ive di~~erent representations 
o~ emotion sequences ~rom nine sets o~ prearranged emotion clusters 
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<derived From an earlier study on the prevalence of 72 emotions in 
diFferent types of interpersonal relationship; Clarke, Allen & 
Dickson, 1985). 
At the macro level, the results of this study were interesting 
in that they identiFied <albeit very loosely) some of the kinds of 
emotional progressions and patterns in which the typical couple 
might expect to be engaged at diFFerent times over the course of 
their relationship. However, at the micro level~ the analysis Was 
less useFul, given the lack of any theoretical account of the 
connections between the emotions within the nine clusters, or of the 
progressions between the emotion clusters themselves. Clearly~ these 
kinds of data would prove more useFul iF they were integrated with a 
thoroughly detailed analysis of the prototypical Features (including 
cognitive appraisals) that accompany not only the shiFts between 
emotional SUbsystems, but also the shiFts From one discrete kind of 
emotion to another within each subsystem~ 
Emotion KnowlfiHjQ!! Within Ct,wnmt Model.s of C105~ 
Relationship 
The results of these four stUdies demonstrate that married 
people have store~ emotion knowledge structures about eliciting 
events, symptoms, urges, appraisals and behaviours For a number of 
discrete emotions. No doubt, these structures proFoundly inFluence 
the ways in which married people perceive, interpret and experience 
events and emotions in their relationships with one another. 
However, to date~ there has been limited treatment of emotion and 
emotion knowledge structures within theoretical models of close 
relationship processes. For example, by restricting their deFinition 
of aFFect to observable, positive and negative nonverbal behaviours, 
Gottman and his colleagues have assigned emotion a relatively minor 
lU:t 
role in marital interaction. Similarly, Berscheid's (1983) analysis 
o~ emotion elicitation in close relationships implies that emotions 
are relatively mindless, semi-automatic, physiological and 
behavioural reactions to partner-caused interruptive events. 
Clearly, both approaches are at odds with the emotion knowledge 
structure approach adopted in this research. 
Recently, a number o~ theorists working ~rom within a social 
cognitive perspective have included the role o~ emotion in 
interactive close relationship research (see Fletcher & Fincham~ in 
press). In particular, Bradbury and Fincham (1987) have developed a 
model o~ cognition and emotion in marriage, based on Weiner's (1985) 
causal attribution theory o~ emotion: this is termed the contextual 
model. According to Bradbury and Fincham's model, attributions ~or 
interruptive relationship events are related to speci~ic, emotional 
consequences. Thus, during an interaction such as a problem solving 
discussion~ behavioural input ~rom one partner (e. g. a critical 
remark) triggers an initial a~~ective response (positive or 
negative) in the other, based on an immediate, primary appraisal or 
the behaviour'S valence. A causal search is then undertaken to 
identi~y the cause o~ the event and assign responsibility ~or it. 
This is a conscious~ secondary appraisal process, and leads to the 
speci~ic emotional reaction. 
An immediate problem that arises with this model is that, as 
these studies have illustrated, causal locus is only one ractor in 
the elicitation o~ speci~ic emotions. Thus, this theory needs a much 
wider range o~ cognitive appraisal ~eatures ir it is to predict 
speci~ic emotion outcomes with any degree o~ accuracy. However, the 
model does represent an important advance over Weiner 7 s analysis, 
because it attempts to come to grips with some o~ the contextual 
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~eatures that in~luence both the primary and secondary appraisal 
processes involved in emotion. Speci~ically, Bradbury and Fincham 
draw a distinction between the proximal and distal context o~ an 
event. The proximal conteNt refers to such variables as the thoughts 
and +eelings o~ a partner immediately prior to processing an event. 
For example, a bad mood may in~luence perception processes, 
resulting in selective attention being paid to the negative ~spects 
0+ a situation. Thus, a remark that might have been shrugged 0++ one 
day, is perceived as being un+airly critical the next. The distal 
context re+ers to dispositional constructs stored in long-term 
memory and includes such variables as an individual's characteristic 
way of viewing the wQrld and interpreting situations, along with his 
or her belie+s and expectations about relationships and what 
constitutes acceptable partner behaviour. 
The contextual model has been +urther developed by Fletcher 
and Fincham (in press), who include in the distal context such 
variables as relationship satis+action, relationship belie+s, and 
relationship knowledge structures. All of these variables are held 
to in+luence the way in which close relationship partners perceive 
and interpret each other's behaviours in interactive settings. 
However, although the importance of affective states (e. g. moods) 
in priming attributional activity in the proximal context is 
acknowledged in the contextual model, the role that emotion 
knowledge structures (included in the distal context) might play is 
ignored. 
Given the neglect 0+ emotion in close relationship research 
generally, this omission is, perhaps, not surprising. However, the 
results 0+ this series 0+ stUdies clearly indicate that partners~ 
perceptions, cognitive appraisals and emotional reactions in 
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response to relationship events and partner behaviours are likely to 
be power~ully shaped by their emotion knowledge structures. Thus, I 
believe the explanatory power o~ social cognitive models o~ close 
relationship interaction would be considerably enhanced i~ emotion 
knowledge structures were treated as an integral part o~ the distal 
context, along with more general relationship knowledge structures. 
No doubt, expanding the scope o~ social cognitive theory and 
research in close relationships to include a consideration o~ 
emotion knowledge structures, particularly within interactive 
settings, presents a number o~ complex and challenging tasks to 
investigators. However, some suggestions ~or research along these 
lines have been made already_ Another suitable methodology ~or 
tapping into distal knowledge structures and emotion in 
relationships could involve the detailed study o~ participants' 
stories, or accounts o~ emotionally relevant relationship events 
(Harvey, Agostinelli and Weber, 1989). 
To conclude, I believe the lack o~ an overall theoretical ~ocus 
has hampered the investigation o~ emotions and emotion knowledge in 
close relationships. Clearly, i~ such models are to develop into 
more power~ul explanatory accounts o~ relationship (including 
emotion) processes, then the time has come ~or a rapprochement 
between the two areas. 
Love, Hate, Anger, Jealousy: Basic Emotions? 
Since the inception o~ this research programme, disquiet has 
been growing amongst emotion theorists and researchers concerning 
the relations between accounts o~ emotion concepts on the one hand, 
and what Clore & Ortony (1991) call "emotions proper" on the other. 
Shaver et al. (1987) ~uelled the debate when, in the course o~ their 
prototype analysis o~ love, anger, ~ear, sorrow and joy, they 
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speculated that these basic semantic categories possibly re~lected a 
biological basicness; that is, humans may be hard-wired ~or the ~ive 
states represented by these particular emotion concepts. Johnson-
Laird & Oatley (1989) argued an even stronger case when they 
asserted that the words used to describe emotional experiences are 
intimately related to the real nature o~ emotions, and that every 
type o~ emotion depends on a small set o~ emotional modes, expressed 
semantically (and in English!) as happiness, sadness, ~ear, anger 
and disgust. 
Other theorists, however, warn against making assumptions o~ 
this nature. For example, Russell (1991) argues that the topic o~ a 
prototype analysis is concepts, and not the events so 
conceptualized. And, Scherer (1988) urges ~or a clear distinction to 
be made between emotion labelling studies~ which are concerned with 
the shared social representation o~ the meaning structure o~ emotion 
terms, and studies o~ emotional states or processes. This latter 
category, he speculates, may be unknowable in a verbal senSe. 
One reaSon ~or this growing debate appears to originate ~rom 
the long-standing tendency o~ theorists to conceive o~ emotions as 
being organized in a hierarchical ~ashion (Averill, 1990). This 
belie~ has led to a number o~ attempts to discover the irreducible, 
biological qualia ~rom which all emotions are derived (e. g. Izard, 
1977), as well as attempts by theorists like Shaver et al. (1987) 
and Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1987) to discover the corresponding 
semantic qualia ~rom which all emotion concepts are derived. 
However, I believe there is a very real problem in trying to 
equate a semantically basic concept, such as anger, or love, with a 
biologically basic brain structure. As emotion prototype research 
(including the present study) has demonstrated, emotions are not 
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objects with necessary and surricient properties that can be 
concisely encapsulated within a single word, no matter how basic. 
Rather, emotions are complex syndromes, constructed rrom within each 
individual~s social world, and comprising physiological, 
behavioural, cognitive and social components (no one or which is 
necessary or surricient to derine a particular emotion). From this 
perspective, there are no emotions proper; rather, there are a 
number or overlapping and ruzzily derined emotion syndromes with 
cognitive, social, behavioural and phenomenological components. No 
one component can be lirted out and derined as the emotion. 
Accordingly, an analysis or, say~ the cognitive component or an 
emotion syndrome is no less basic than is an analysis or the 
physiological, or phenomenological component. 
In accord with this perspective, a number or theorists (e. g. 
Ortony & Turner, 1990; Ellsworth~ 1991) have suggested that we do 
away with the idea or so-called basic emotions altogether. Rather, 
it is more userul to conceive or emotions as combinations or a 
number Or dirrerent components and subcomponents, e. g. emotional 
responses and expressions (some or which may be biologically basic), 
and sequences Or cognitive appraisals~ than to seek basic, retried, 
emotion entities. From this viewpoint, the study or emotion 
syndromes can be proritably tackled rrom a number or dirrerent 
levels or analysis, ranging rrom micro investigations or the 
physiological, behavioural or cognitive components and SUbcomponents 
Or emotions, to broad, sweeping investigations or the history and 
social construction or emotions within and across cultUres (e. g. 
Hochschild, 1983; Harre, 1986; Stearns, 1989).3 
Previously, I argued that rurther research needs to examine the 
links between emotion prototypes and cognitive appraisal patterns, 
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along with other constructs such as behaviour and physiology_ I 
believe the analysis o~~ered here makes it clear that this process 
Can be viewed as a way o~ unpackaging and analysing the emotion 
syndromes themselves. 
Conclusion 
The ~ocus o~ this research has been the laypersonPs socially 
shared knowledge structures (including cognitive, physiological and 
behavioural elements> about love, anger, hate and jealousy in 
marriage. The results indicate that each or these emotion labels 
represents a meaningrul~ discrete, emotion knowledge structure to 
the married layperson. Or course, there are an enormous number or 
questions still to be answered, at both the micro level and the 
macro level. For example, we have a great deal to learn about the 
various emotion syndrome components, each or which received limited 
treatment in the course Or this study. Similarly, we need to know 
much more about the in~luence Or culturally prescribed rules ror 
emotions and emotional expression and regulation in close 
relationships, and we need to locate relationship relevant, emotion 
knowledge structures within more overarching theories of close 
relationship processes. 
Nonetheless, the results Or this series or studies represent a 
beginning in the long overdue exploration or emotions in close 
relationships. Further work in this area should lead to a deeper 
I 
understanding Or this mysterious, but central, aspect Or human 
experience. 
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Footnotes 
1 All results in these Four studies were analysed For possible sex 
diFFerences. Consistent with ather emotion prototype or appraisal 
studies, no significant sex differences were found. 
2 The sample size For each of the four factor analyses was very 
small (40 subjects in each group), which considerably reduces the 
power and interpretability of the Factorial solutions. Consequently, 
it was decided not to report these results in the main body of Study 
1. However, the results are summarized in Appendix 6. 
3'With respect to this point, it should be noted that, like emotion, 
marriage is also a socially constructed concept that changes over 
time. Clearly, although research into the changing sociocultural and 
historical constructions of marriage would be a worthwhile exercise, 
integrating such research with an ~nalysis of changing sociocultural 
and historical constructions of emotion(s) would be particularly 
rewarding (e. g. see Bernard?s, 1977, analysis of the interdependent 
relationship between changing concepts of jealousy and marriage). 
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Appendi}: 1 
Emotion Frequency and Intensity Questionnaire 
1) How often do you el-:pet-ience -feelings of love (note, not lust or 
passion) -for your partner? 
(Never) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Always) 
2) Do you ever experience such loving -feelings intensely? 
(Nevet- ) 1 4 5 6 (Always) 
3) How often do you -feel jealous in relation to your partner? 
(Never) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Always) 
4) Do you ever expet- ience such jealous -feel i ngs intensely? 
(Never) 1 '") 3 4 5 6 (Always) ""-
5) How o-ften do you experience -feelings o-f hatred -for your partner? 
(Never) 1 '") 3 4 5 6 (Always) 
-'-
6) Do YOll ever e}:per ience such -feelings of hatt-ed intensely? 
(Never) 1 '") 3 4 5 6 (Always) .L. 
7) How often do you get anm:Y with your partner? 
(Never) 1 3 4 5 6 (Always) 
8) Do you ever experience such -feelings o-f anger intensely? 
(Never) 1 ;2 4 5 6 (Always) 
1.17 
Appendi>: 2 
Along with completing an emotion rrequency and intensity 
questionnaire in Study 1~ married subjects also completed three 
individual dirrerence measures: Relationship Happiness (Grigg, 
Fletcher & Fitness, 1989)~ Attachment Style (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) 
and A~~ect Intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987). 
The Relationship Happiness Questionnaire includes six global 
judgements on 6 pt. scales measuring perceptions o~ love, happiness, 
general satisraction, relationship stability, seriousness o~ 
problems, and level or commitment. The scale has demonstrated good 
internal reliability, test-retest reliability and convergent 
validity in previous research (see Fletcher, Fitness & Blampied, 
1990) . 
The Attachment Style Questionnaire was derived ~rom Hazan & 
Shaver's (1987) three-item attachment measure, and includ~s 12 items 
on 6 pt. scales (~our items measuring each attachment style: secure, 
avoidant and anxious-ambivalent). Theoretically, people with a 
secure attachment style are trusting and com~ortable with closeness, 
unlike people with an avoidant style, who are distrustrul and 
uncom~ortable with closeness. Anxious-ambivalent subjects are 
thought to be concerned with insu~ricient closehess and emotionally 
labile - experiencing the heights o~ ecstasy and the depths o~ 
despair in their relati6nships. 
Finally, the A~rect Intensity questionnaire (AIM) includes 40 
items on 6 pt. scales and measures subjects' characteristic 
emotional intensity. This scale has undergone rigorous testing and 
is considered to be both a reliable and valid measure o~ 
dispositional arrect intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987). 
These scales were administered ror exploratory, rather than 
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theoretical~ reasons~ and the results are not germane to the major 
theme o~ the research programme. However, as can be seen in Table 7, 
some interesting correlations were obtained between the three 
measures and emotion ~requency and intensity. 
As might be expected~ relationship happiness was positively 
related to the ~requency and intensity o~ love, but, unexpectedly, 
relationship happiness was also positively related to the ~requency 
o~ jealousy. Also as expected, subjects with high A~~ect Intensity 
tended to experience love, anger and jealousy (although not hate) 
intensely. Again, however, an unexpected ~inding was that high 
A~~ect Intensity was also related to the ~requency o~ jealousy. 
Anxious-ambivalent subjects appear to have the most miserable 
time o~ it in their relationships~ experiencing hate, anger and 
jealousy ~requently, love only in~requently, and anger and jealousy 
intensely. Avoidant subjects appear to ~xperience love in~requently~ 
but do not experi_nee ne9ative emotions particularly ~requently; 
nonetheless, when they ~eel angry, it tends to be intense. Finally, 
secure subjects experience love ~requently~ though not intensely, 
and are particularly unlikely to experience hate intensely. 
Although these results are only preliminary, they suggest a 
number o~ interesting directions ~or ~urther research, and 
underscore the importance o~ considering individual di~~erence 
measures when conducti~g in-depth analyses o~ couples' a~~ective 
lives. 
:1, :L .::; 
Table 7 
(AIM>, RelationshiR Ha~in§E2 ~nd Attachment 
Frequency Happy AIM Secure Avoid Amdous 
------------~------------------------~-----------------
Love .55*** .14 • 38U<t -.23* -.25** 
Hate -.17 .21 -.09 • 11 .31*** 
Anget- -.17 . 19 -.17 .10 .32*** 
Jealousy .25** .29*** -.01 .05 .32*** 
Intensity 
Love .43*** .. 32*** .21 -.16 -.03 
Hate -.14 .21 -.28*** .16 .20 
Anger -.09 
.28*** .18 .24** .30*** 
Jealousy .16 .27*** -.08 .00 .25** 
------------------------------------~-------------------------------
Appendb: 3 
Emotion questionnaire 
First, just relax. 
When you +eel relaxed and com+ortable~ try to remember the most 
rfecent time you felt particularly JEAL,OUS in nalatit:m to YOt.tr 
partner. Don~t panic i+ you can't think 0+ an incident right away, 
just relax and dri+t mentally through your memories 0+ your 11+e 
with your partner. Remember, there is no right or wrong way to' think 
about what "jealousy" means - you can interpret the word any way you 
want. Just think about an incident with your partner in which you 
personally +elt "jealous" (even i+ only mildly). 
When you've thought 0+ an incident, take a +ew moments to recall 
as many details 0+ the incident as you can, and concentrate on the 
JEALOUS +eeling you had. Imagine you are back in that situation; 
what happened? How does it +eel? When you're ready, please answer 
the questions below (take as much time and paper as you want). 
Remember, you must answer the questions according to how you +elt 
THEN, not how you see the situation now. Imagine, you are back in 
that situation •••. 
1) How long ago did tnis incident happen? 
. 
2) What kind 0+ emotional state or mood were you in be+ore the 
i nci dent? 
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3) Please explain in detail what actually happened to make you ¥eel 
jealous. 
4) What were you thinking while you were jealous? 
5) What did you say, i~ anything, and how did you say it? 
6) What did you ~eel physically while you were jealous? (For 
example, in your stomach~ or muscles, etc.) 
7) Oi d you have an urge to do somethi n9 whi le you were jealous, eVen 
though you may not have given way to it? 
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8) What did you do while you were ~eeling jealous? 
9)' Did you try to control your jealousy? Why or why not? 
10) I~ you tried to control your jealousy, how did you do that? Was 
it di~~icult? Why? 
11) About how long did the jealous ~eeling last? 
(Please tick) 
seconds 
minutes 
hours 
days 
Other (please speci~y) 
13} How did your partner react to your jealousy? 
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14) What was your emotional state, or mood, a~ter the incident was 
allover? 
15) Can you add anything else that would help describe the jealousy 
episode more ~ully? 
Please think once more about the jealous episode with your 
Using your key, please circle the number that best describes how yOI 
how you see or understand the 
situation now). 
1) Was your jealousy an -feeling? 
(Not at all) 1 4 5 6 (Extremely> 
2) At the time, how Qle~ani Q~ ~QP~~AE~nt was it to be in this 
situation? 
(Very unpleasant) 1 2 3 4 5 6 <E~tremely pleasant) 
3) At the time, did the incident that made you jealous 
great deal to you? 
a 
(Not at all> 1 2 3 4 5 6 <Extn'!mel y) 
4) Was the incident that made you jealbus unexpected? 
<Not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Extremely) 
5) At the time~ to what extent did you -feel the incident that made 
you jealous was gQod -for you and your n:~lationship? 
<Not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6) At the time, how certain were you that you 
happening in the situation? 
(Not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
(E::tremel y) 
what was 
(Very certain) 
7) Did you have to make a real e-f-fort <physical or mental) to cope 
with this situation? 
(Not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (A great deal) 
8) Think about what you needed ru::. wanted in this situation. To what 
extent did there seem to be ser~~ts obstacles in the way o-f getting 
what you wanted or needed? 
(No obstacles) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Serious obstacles) 
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9) While you were in this situation, how well did you ~eel that you 
could Rrer.fli..!;;t what was going to happen ne}:t? 
(Not at all) 1 2 4 5 6 (A great deal) 
10) At the time~ to what e}~tent did YOLt ~eel Y.P4 were to blame ~o,~ the 
incident? 
(Not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Completely) 
1 U At the time~ to whgt f;H~tant ditl yo!'! ffillil Y,JilhM: Il3fuU:tOW:, W8~ tg 
blame ~or the incident? 
(Not at all) 1 2 4 5 
12) To what extent did YOll feel you were 111 
that made you feel jealous? 
(Not at all) 1 ' 2 3 4 
13) To what e>:tent did you -feel your 
incident? 
(Not at all) 1 2 3 4 
5 
5 
6 (Completely) 
o~ the incident 
6 (Completely) 
was in control of the 
6 (Completely) 
14) To what e>:tent did you feel this incident was somehow "typical" 
and would probably happen again in the ~uture? 
(Not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 <E>:tremel y> 
15) Please think about the £.au~e or causes of your jealousy. To t.,hat 
eMtent do you think your feeling was caused by your partner, 
yourself, or outside circumstances? 
Partner: 
Very unimportant 
Cause 1 2 3 4 5 
Very unimportant 
Cause 1 2 3 4 5 
~ircumstances and external influences: 
Very unimportant 
Cause 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
6 
6 
\ 
Extremely 
Important cause 
E~·:tremel y 
Important cause 
E,:tremel y 
Important cause 
18) To what extent do you think the causes(s) o~ your ~eeling o~ 
jealousy would be ~cit=iE to this one situation? 
Not at all 
speciric: present 
in many areas Or 
the relationship 1 -;< 
--' 4 5 6 
Completely 
situation 
speci~ic 
AppendiN 4 
To answer the questions in this questionnaire~ you just circle 
the number underneath the question that best represents your 
op i ni on. For S}lamp le~ i -F the quest ion reads: "How o-Ften do you hug 
YOLW partner?" and your answer is "Never"~ you would circle number 
1. I-F your answer is "Quite o-ften"~ you would circle numbet- 4. 
Keep this key with you as you go through the questions~ just to 
remind you what the numbers underneath the questions stand -For. 
1 = Not at all; Never 
'") 
= Very little; Not much; Hardly ever .L. 
3 = Moderately; Sometimes; Occasionally; Somewhat 
4 = Quite a lot; Quite o-Ften 
5 = Very much; Very o-Ften; Usually; Almost always 
6 = Extremely; Always 
j "},') ", ... ) 
Appendi>: 5 
Hypothetical Emotion Questionnaire 
EMOTION: HATRED. 
Forgetting about your own relationship speci~ically, please 
think about the most typical kind o~ incident that makes one pat-tner 
hate the other in a close relationship. Just one example will do, 
but try and make it the moat typical example you can think of. Now, 
please answer the questions below (take as much time and paper as 
you want). 
1) What would probably have happened to make one partner ~eel hatred 
~or the other? 
2) Who or what is usually to blame ~or the incident? 
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3) How do you think the person hating their partner would ~eel 
physically? 
4) What do you think the person hating th.ir partner has the urge to 
do? 
( 
5) What would he or she probably be thinking? 
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6) Would he or she be likely to express the ~eelings o~ hatred? I~ 
so, how? 
7) Is there anything else you can think o~ that would describe a 
typical incident involving hatred more ~ully? 
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Appendix 6 
Factor ~nalysis Results o~ Cognitive Appraisal Dimensions ~r~~ St~ 
1 
The cognitive appraisal dimension items ~or each emotion in 
Study 1 were submitted to a principal components ~actar analysis. 
Because o~ the small number o~ subjects in each analysis, (n = 40), 
the analyses were exploratory only, and the results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
For each emotion, three factors with aigan values greater than 
1 were obtained ~rom orthogonal, rotated analyses. The three ~actors 
~or each emotion accounted ~or between 42% and 45% o~ the variance, 
a~d accounted ~or approximately equal amounts o~ variance. 
Interestingly, and in accord with emotion-eliciting events, a 
de~inite locus/responsibility ~actor emerged ~or all ~our emotions. 
For example, the ~irst ~actor extracted ~or love was clearly related 
to sel~, with ~actor loadings o~ .59 ~or sel~ responsibility, .57 
for self-causa, and .54 for self b~ing in control of the event. For 
anger, the ~irst ~actor extracted was partner related, with ~actor 
loadings o~ .71 ~or partner-cause, .59 ~or partner responsibility, 
and -.52 ~or sel~ responsibility. For hate, the second ~actor was 
partner related, with ~actor loadings o~ -.82 ~or sel~ 
responsibility, .77 ~or partner ~esponsibility, -.64 ~or sel~-cause, 
-.49 ~or sel~ in control, .46 ~or partner-cause, and .44 ~or partner 
in control. For jealousy, the second ~actor was clearly related to 
external-cause, with ~actor loadings o~ -.82 ~or sel~-cause, .71 ~or 
a situationally speci~ic cause, .57 ~or an external-cause, and -.48 
~or self responsibility. 
Although the sample sizes were too small to allow confident 
interpretations of the results, they do suggest that causal locus is 
an important appraisal dimension in emotion labelling. 
:I. :~:; :~:; 
Appendix 7 
Study 3 Emotion Questionnaire 
First, just relax. 
Now, p lea.se imag i ne tha.t you are feel i ng LO~VE for your partner. 
The reason you are ~eeling love, or the cause o~ your loving 
-feeling, is something to do with YOUR PARTNER and what your Qprtner 
is doi ng. Yo!:,!,!::, Q...art.ner can take credi t -for the -feel i ng, your part.ner 
is responsible -for the -feeling. For example, it might be that your 
partner is supporting you through a di-f~icult time, or has bought 
you a special gi-ft. 
Take a ~ew minutes to imagine the scene •• yau are -feeling love ~or 
your partner, and the cause is something to do with your partner ••. 
Wh~n you -feel you are,ready, please answer the questions below. 
1) What kind o~ event have you imagined? What has happened? 
2) Concentrate on the -feeling o-f love. How intense is the -feeling? 
(Not intense) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (E>:tt-emely 
3) How unpleasant or pleasant is this situation ~or you? 
(E>:tremel y 1 '") "7 4 <= 6 (E>:treme I y "- .J .J 
Unpleasant) Pleasant) 
4) How important is this situation in the context 0+ your 
relationship? 
intense) 
(Not important) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Very important) 
5) How certain are you that you truly understand the situation? 
(E}:t r-eme I y 
Uncer-tai n) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 (E>:tr-emel y 
Cer-tain) 
6) How unexpected is the situation that has caused your love? 
(Completely 
Une>:pected) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 (Completely 
Expected) 
7) Are you having to make a real e~~or-t (physical or mental) to cope 
with the situation? 
(No e~~ort) 1 2 4 5 6 (Extreme e~~ort) 
8) Are ther-e serious obstacles getting in the way o~ what you need 
or- want? 
(No obstacles) 1 2 4 5 6 (Extreme obstacles) 
9) Keep imagining yoursel~ in the situation. How well can you 
pr-edict what will happen next? 
(Can't pr-edict) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Easily predict) 
10) To what extent do you ~eel in control o~ the situation? 
(No control) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Complete contr-ol) 
11) To what extent do you think your partner is in contr-ol o~ the 
situation? 
(No control) 1 3 4 5 6 (Complete contr-ol) 
12) To what extent do you think you have caused this ~eeling o~ 
love? 
(Not at all) 1 3 4 5 6 (Completely) 
13) To what extent do you think your par-tner has caused this feeling 
of love? 
(Not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Completely) 
14) To what extent do you think external circumstances have caused 
this ~eeling of love? 
(Not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Completely) 
15) Do you -feel the situation is somehow "typical" and will probably 
happen again in the -future? 
(Not typical) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Extremely typical) 
16) Remember that YOUR PARTNER is responsible -for this -feeling o-f 
love. How o-ften do you think he or she would be speci-fically 
responsible -for other loving occasions in your relationship? 
(Not o-ften) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Extremely o-ften) 
